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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates whether it is still possible to generate abnormal returns by applying SRI investment 
strategies. Early academic literature states a link between high ESG scores and abnormal returns. While 
that link vanished over time, due to a correction of the mispricing, using new data and methods recent 
papers once again report that a link between high ESG scores and abnormal returns exists. 
 
Using a new set of ESG data acquired from Thomson Reuters ASSET4, as well as the new Fama and French 
five-factor model, this thesis investigates the financial performance of SRI in the US by using the S&P 500 
investment universe to construct portfolios sorted on ESG scores. This thesis finds that SRI outperforms 
conventional investments in the US only during crises periods. 
 
Covering a time horizon of 14 years, from January 2003 to January 2017, this thesis finds that portfolios 
sorted on the stocks of the 25% best rated companies in the Environmental-, Social-, and Governance di-
mension, as well as a combined ESG dimension, do not perform any different compared to conventional 
investments. Neither does a long-short approach of buying (selling) the top (bottom) 25% stocks. While 
SRI neither over-, nor underperforms under normal circumstances, the results indicate that low scores in 
the Environmental dimension are related to slightly negative returns. 
 
In a series of following tests, this thesis investigates the performance of SRI during the financial crisis of 
August 2007 to March 2009. The author finds that over the whole sample period, as well as two sub-sample 
periods representing the decline of credit supply period and the decline of market trust period, SRI over-
performs compared to conventional investments. Specifically, a portfolio consisting of the 25% best stocks 
of the Environmental dimension consistently outperforms, generating highly statistical return of 0.4% to 
1.4%, and a portfolio sorted on the combined ESG score generates 0.5% to 0.6%. Furthermore, results 
indicate that a long-short approach over the Environmental dimension can generate 1.2% to 1.3%, and 
around 1.3% for the ESG dimension. Scores from the Social- and the Governance dimensions are individ-
ually not related to abnormal returns in any way. 
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1. INTODUCTION 
 
Traditional standard asset pricing models such as the “Capital Asset Pricing Model” 
(CAPM) as defined by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), or its variations, the “Inter-
temporal Capital Asset Pricing Model” (ICAPM) and the “Consumption Capital Asset 
Pricing Model” (CCAPM), as defined by Merton (1973) and Lucas (1978), and Breeden 
(1979) respectively, share common assumptions about investors. More specifically, these 
standard asset pricing models agree on the assumption that investors prioritize the antic-
ipated payoff of their investments in their decision making process. However, as de-
scribed by Fama & French (2007), examples for violations to this assumption are abun-
dant in academic literature. 
 
One of the more recent and prominent violations to the assumption that investors only 
care about the payoff of their investment, is the trend of “Social Responsible Investing”, 
or SRI in short. Social Responsible Investors do not necessarily follow the premise of 
maximizing their payoffs, but rather draw utility from the fact that an investment is in line 
with their personal (or law enforced in some cases for institutional investors), religious-, 
political-, environmental- or ethical values and concerns. 
 
Over the last two decades, and even more strongly so in the last few years, SRI has expe-
rienced a tremendous growth phase. In the United Stated alone, the market size of ESG 
themed investments grew by 33%, to USD $8.72 trillion, from 2014 to 2016. This means 
that around one out of five dollars under professional management is invested in SRI 
assets. Continuing, the SRI assets are held by over 470 institutional investors, 300 money 
manager, and over 1000 investment funds (USSIF 2016). However, this trend is not con-
fined to the US alone. In Europe, the growth of ESG themed assets experiences rates of 
up to 296%, depending on the SRI strategy investigated (Eurosif 2016).  
 
With over $4.72 trillion under management in the US according to USSIF (2016), and 
around 80% of all SRI themed investments in Europe according to Eurosif (2016), insti-
tutional investors such as healthcare- or pension funds play a significant role in the ESG 
market. Even in the face of increased awareness and demand for ESG themed assets by 
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private investors, and the accelerated growth of the retail market for such products, the 
role of institutional investors remains unchallenged as of today. (USSIF 2016, Eurosif 
2016)  
 
Further evidence for the importance of the topic, and the dominance of institutional in-
vestors, is given by Principles for Responsible Investment (2016a). According to the 
source, over 1700 institutional investors from over 50 countries, which together have ap-
proximately USD $70 trillion under management, have signed the United Nations backed 
“Six Principles for Responsible Investment”, incorporating ESG issues into their invest-
ment analysis and decision-making processes. Moreover, there are country level policies 
and regulations such as: “The National Pension Act” of Korea, the government pension 
fund’s mandate of Norway, “The National Pension Insurance Fund Act” of Sweden, or 
the planned “Occupational Retirement Provision Directive” (IORP II) of the European 
Union. These principles have in common that they force some of the largest pension funds 
in the world to incorporate ESG criteria into their analyses and portfolio creation pro-
cesses, and disclose how ESG issues were considered in their investment approaches. 
(Principles for Responsible Investment (2016b) 
 
As evident by the growth rates and the amount of money involved, Social Responsible 
Investing and ESG-criteria analysis are highly relevant topics, which are not only inter-
esting for institutional investors, policy makers and academic researchers, but also for a 
growing number of private investors. Analyzing the performance of SRI, and in extension 
ESG criteria, is an up-to-date topic that holds high relevancy in the present and near fu-
ture, warranting additional research into this topic. 
 
 
1.1. Research question, hypotheses, and contribution 
 
The majority of the academic research on SRI of the last decade is focused on analyzing 
whether the incorporation of SRI into investment decisions affects financial performance 
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(Revelli & Viviani 2015). However, the results of SRI research remain at large conflict-
ing, which is reflected in the three hypothesis regarding the performance of SRI invest-
ments: 
 
The underperformance hypothesis states that due to screening processes inherent in SRI 
investment strategies, potential investors impose constraints on their investment universe, 
limiting their diversification potential and thus achieving less favorable risk-return con-
ditions in comparison to conventional investments (Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang 
2008b). The second hypothesis, the over-performance hypothesis, is based on the argu-
ments that high performance in Environmental, Social, or Governance related issues leads 
to a number of positive effects. High ESG scores can be regarded as a sign for managerial 
skill, translating into better financial performance, or they can reduce costs during crises 
(Renneboog et al. 2008b). The third and final hypothesis states that SRI neither destroys 
nor adds value, as the expected risk adjusted returns of SRI stocks equals those of con-
ventional stocks (Revelli & Viviani 2015). 
 
Investigating academic literature, the majority states that the incorporation of SRI neither 
destroys, nor adds value, as the performance is not significantly different from conven-
tional investments. However, many of these earlier papers are subject to limitations such 
as incomparable data and methods. Newer papers such as from Borgers, Derwall, 
Koedijk, & Ter Horst (2013) and Bebchuk, Cohen, & Wang (2013), address these limi-
tations and reinvestigate the performance of SRI under the premise of market learning 
and errors in expectations. These papers find that while SRI in fact yielded abnormal 
positive returns in the past, it does not anymore since 2001. The reason being a learning 
effect on behalf of the market participants, who learned to price the information encom-
passed in SRI correctly, seemingly ending the debate about the performance of SRI. How-
ever most recently, papers by Auer (2016) and Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2017) report 
new results, conflicting with those of Borgers et al. (2013) and Bebchuk et al. (2013). 
Using new sets of data and methods, Auer (2016) and Lins et al. (2017), find that it is still 
possible to achieve abnormal returns by integrating SRI into investment decisions. 
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In light of the heterogeneous results provided by academic literature on the financial per-
formance of SRI, the purpose of this thesis is it to once again reexamine the relationship 
and answer the following research question: 
 
“Is it still possible to achieve superior returns with a SRI investment strategy in the US?” 
 
To answer this research question, the following hypotheses were developed, and will be 
tested in the empirical part of the study: 
 
H1: High ESG scores are positively related to stock performance at all times. 
 
This hypothesis is linked to the findings of Auer (2016), who recently proved that it is 
still possible for SRI to generate abnormal returns with portfolios sorted on the highest 
ESG scores in Europe. Partly emulating the author, this thesis employs a new set of data 
and methods to reexamine the performance of SRI in the US, aimed answering the ques-
tion, if it still possible nowadays for SRI to achieve superior returns under normal cir-
cumstances. 
 
H2: High ESG scores are positively related to stock performance during financial crisis 
periods. 
 
H3: High ESG scores are positively related to stock performance during credit supply 
shock crisis periods. 
 
H4: High ESG scores are positively related to stock performance during low trust crisis 
periods. 
 
Bebchuk et al. (2013), and Borgers et al. (2013) report that since 2001 it is impossible to 
generate abnormal returns with SRI in the US. However, Lins et al. (2017) show in a 
recent study that SRI is still able to achieve superior returns in the US, however, only 
during crises periods, and more specifically during periods of low trust. These hypotheses 
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support answering the research question by testing whether SRI possibly over-performs 
during more specific times, such as during financial crises periods.  
 
By answering the research question, and testing the hypotheses, this thesis will provide 
the following contributions to academic literature: First, this thesis reexamines estab-
lished literature on the performance of SRI by using new data and methods. This will help 
in providing more clarity in regard to the question whether SRI over-performs, underper-
forms, or does neither. Second, this thesis partially emulates the methods applied by Lins 
et al. (2017). Thus, this thesis serves both, to appraise the results reported by the Lins et 
al. (2017), as well as to possibly establish a narrower answer in regards to the research 
question. Lastly, since the new data and method, the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG 
scores, as well as Fama & French’s (2015) five-factor asset pricing model, have to the 
authors knowledge rarely been used in academic literature, this paper will also serves to 
appraise the usability of both in the context of SRI analysis. 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured in the following way: The second chapter re-
volves around the theoretical background of this paper. More specifically, chapter 2.1 
aims at explaining the concept of SRI, showing its importance, and explaining how SRI 
works. Continuing, chapter 2.2 aims at stating and analyzing all relevant academic liter-
ature on the performance of SRI.  In further detail, chapter 2.1 is divided in four subchap-
ters. Chapter 2.1.1 will explain the relationship between Socially Responsible Investing 
(SRI) and similar names and concept. Chapter 2.1.2 will give a brief historical overview 
over SRI, chapter 2.1.3 will give an overview over the current state of SRI in the world 
supported by market data, and finally, chapter 2.1.4 concludes with a list of SRI strategies, 
tools and techniques. Similarly, chapter 2.2 is divided into two subchapters. Chapter 2.2.1 
describes the literature analyzing CSR and the financial performance of CSR, a strand of 
literature that precedes, and is closely intertwined with literature that analyzes SRI per-
formance. Chapter 2.2.2 gives an in-depth analysis about the state-of-the-art literature that 
revolves around the analysis of the financial performance of SRI. 
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Continuing, the third chapter explains the data employed in this thesis. More specifically, 
chapter 3.1 revolves around describing the data source employed, as well as data sources 
commonly used in SRI analyses. Chapter 3.2 provides a detailed description of the data 
gathered for this thesis, providing first descriptive statistics for the raw data. Following, 
chapter four describes the methodology applied in this paper. More specifically, chapter 
4.1 describes the portfolio construction process applied in this paper, and showcases de-
scriptive statistics of them. Chapter 4.2 describes the model employed in this thesis to 
measure performance. Chapter 5 and its subchapters showcase and explain the results of 
the regression analyses and explain how they relate to the research question and –hypoth-
eses in greater detail. Chapter 5.1 shows the regression results for the whole period anal-
ysis, while chapters 5.2 and 5.3, show the regression results for the financial crisis period, 
and its subsamples, the credit supply decline period and the trust decline period, respec-
tively. Concluding this thesis is chapter 6, which will summarize the results, mention the 
limitations of this study, and elaborate on further possible research. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter of the thesis will describe the theoretical background in greater detail. The 
first subchapter revolves around explaining the concept of Socially Responsible Investing 
(SRI), and aims at explaining its origin, the importance of the topic, the current state of it 
in the modern investment environment, as well as tools and strategies related to SRI. 
Continuing, the second part of this chapter describes and analyses relevant academic lit-
erature on CSR and SRI, as well as their link to financial performance. 
 
 
2.1. Socially Responsible Investing 
 
This first subchapter aims at explaining SRI in greater detail, and is further divided into 
four separate chapters. The first subchapter below will define the concept of SRI and what 
is included in it, while establishing borders to similar related concepts. Continuing, the 
second chapter will provide a brief historical overview, stating the evolution of SRI from 
niche- to mainstream investment strategy. Following up, and supporting the view of SRI 
as a mainstream investment strategy, the third chapter provides detailed numbers and 
graphics of the current market state of SRI. Concluding this first part of the theoretical 
background chapter, the fourth subchapter describes the various tools and strategies ap-
plied in SRI. 
 
2.1.1. Defining SRI 
 
Social Responsible Investment, also known as Socially Responsible Investing, or its ab-
breviation SRI, is just one name among the multitude of names used in academic literature 
for an investment strategy that aims at combining social, ethical and/or environmental 
values of investors with financial return. It is an investment strategy based on the consid-
eration that a potential investor may forego greater financial payoffs for increased social, 
ethical, or environmental benefits (Brzeszczyński & McIntosh 2014). 
 
18 
 
Eccles & Viviers (2011) reviewed 190 academic papers, spanning a period of 35 years 
with the goal to gather and analyze the origins and different meanings of the multitude of 
names given to investment strategies that incorporate Environmental-, Social-, and/or 
Governance criteria. More common names besides “Socially Responsible Investment” 
were found to be: “Ethical Investment”, and more recent “Responsible Investment”. Ad-
ditionally, there exist a more extensive list of less frequently used names such as: “com-
munity investing”, “environmentally responsible investing”, “faith-based investing”, 
“mission-based investing”, “green-“, “red”-, and “white investing”, among various oth-
ers. 
 
When analyzing more common names such as: “Ethical Investment” and “Socially Re-
sponsible Investment”, Sparkes (2001) found that the former description mainly describes 
investors that are bound by values, belief, or a code of conduct. Examples for Ethical 
Investment practitioners are churches, charities, or other investor groups that exhibit al-
truistic behavior and are non-profit driven. Meanwhile Socially Responsible Investment 
is described by Sparkes (2001) as combining ESG criteria with the financial goal to 
achieve at least market level returns. Another term, “Responsible Investment”, which has 
gained prominence since the launch of the United Nations supported Principles for Re-
sponsible Investment, is defined by Eccles & Viviers (2011) as an investment strategy 
that incorporates ESG considerations with the main intention of achieving higher risk-
adjusted returns. 
 
While there are a multitude of names describing investment strategies aimed at integrating 
ESG criteria into decision making processes, in this thesis, the abbreviation “SRI” will be 
used as a synonym for all investment activities that integrate Environmental-, Social-, 
and/or Corporate Governance aspects, whether the strategy aims at creating superior re-
turns, reaching the market level, or solely focuses on an added personal value aspect.  
Furthermore, “E” will be used as an abbreviation for Environmental, “S” for Social, and 
“G” for Corporate Governance, while “ESG” describes a combination of all three dimen-
sions. 
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SRI itself is a facet of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) trend. The definition for 
CSR, as proposed by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2000) is 
the following: “CSR is the commitment of a business to contribute to sustainable eco-
nomic development, working with employees, their families, the local community and so-
ciety at large to improve the quality of life”. CSR has become an important topic due to 
an increased demand by the public and policymakers alike, nudging corporations to as-
sume responsibility towards the environment, society, and their stakeholders (Renneboog 
et al. 2008b).  
 
Barnett (2007) states that CSR is the act of increasing social welfare and improving the 
relationship with stakeholders through company engagement. This engagement takes the 
form of company investments into activities such as for example reducing company 
waste, strengthening local communities, or improving shareholder rights. Continuing, 
agencies such as Thomson Reuters ASSET4 (2017a), gather the information on a com-
pany’s CSR engagement, sort it into one of the three dimension: Environmental, Social, 
or Governance, and proceed to construct company individual scores for these dimensions, 
rating a company’s CSR engagement. These ESG scores carry information that is in turn 
used by SRI investors to construct investment strategies. Hence, SRI can be considered a 
facet of CSR, as it is an investment strategy that aims on capitalizing on CSR, which in 
turn promotes further company CSR engagement. 
 
To summarize the relationship between CSR, ESG, and SRI: CSR is company level en-
gagement in various activities that are considered out of scope for the company, such as  
for example expenses for emission reduction. Agencies rate this company level CSR en-
gagement and construct ESG scores to quantify this information for investors. SRI is an 
investment strategy based on incorporating ESG considerations, hence investors use this 
information acquired from agencies in their investment decisions. 
 
2.1.2. Historical overview 
 
While the exact place of origin and circumstances that lead to the creation of our modern 
notion of SRI is contested, academic literature generally agrees one the fact that the root 
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of SRI predates recent decades. Authors such as Schueth (2003), Derwall Koedijk & Ter 
Horst (2011), and Brzeszczyński & McIntosh (2014), identify the historical roots of SRI 
in religious values, -concepts, and -institutions. A notion that can still be seen in the pre-
vailing widespread aversion of stocks of companies that promote alcohol, tobacco, gam-
bling, weapons, or adult entertainment (Hong & Kacperczyk 2009). 
 
According to academic literature, our modern notion of the term SRI is something that 
evolved only in recent decades, starting in the 1960’s. More specifically, authors such as 
Schueth (2003) and Kinder (2005) claim that the Social Responsible Investment move-
ment emerged in the United States during the political climate of the 1960. The emerging 
civil rights movements gave rise to a greater concern for topics such as the Vietnam War, 
the Apartheid regime in South Africa, and equal rights for women, which contributed to 
a rise in the awareness towards social responsibility as an issue (Schueth 2003). Con-
trasting this view on the origin of SRI, Louche & Lydenberg (2006), and Bengtsson 
(2008), state that the emergence of modern SRI in Europe predates the emergence of SRI 
in the US. Bengtsson (2008) presents the example of “AktieAnsvar Aktienfond”, estab-
lished as early as 1965, as one of the first ethical funds accessible by the public. Addi-
tionally, the author reports that the Methodist Church of the United Kingdom established 
an ethical fund in 1960, presenting evidence that early concepts of modern SRI were al-
ready in practice in Europe during that time. 
 
While the origin of modern SRI is contested, its evolution in the US and Europe followed 
very similar patterns. The following decade, the 1970’s, saw the social responsibility 
movement grow in size and depth, as the awareness towards topics such management 
practices and labor conditions increased. This in turn added the dimension of Corporate 
Governance to the early concept of SRI (Schueth 2003). Continuing the evolution of SRI, 
the 1980’s saw an increase in the awareness for environmental issues worldwide. Factors 
that played a great role during this time were the Exxon Valdez incident which caused 
one of the greatest environmental catastrophes in the US, the Chernobyl incident in Eu-
rope, the growing hole in the ozone layer above Australia, and new information about 
global warming. All those environmental catastrophes lead to an increased awareness for 
environmental protection, adding the Environmental dimension to SRI. (Schueth 2003). 
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In line with this development, Bengtsson (2008) reports the establishment of Scandina-
vian environmental funds from the 1980’s onward. 
 
During the 1990’s and 2000’s, SRI started to become a global phenomenon, with govern-
ments and institutional investors taking the lead in defining and spreading the concept of 
SRI. Renneboog et al. (2008b) provide ample examples for the regulatory background 
during that period which supported the worldwide growth of the SRI industry. For exam-
ple in 1991 and 1995 respectively, the German and Dutch governments introduced tax 
advantages for investments in the renewable energy industry. Furthermore, in 2000, the 
UK passed an amendment to its pension act, enforcing the disclosure of the extent to 
which social, environmental, and ethical considerations were integrated into the invest-
ment process. Similar regulation were passed by numerous other European countries in 
the following years. (Renneboog et al. 2008b)   
 
2.1.3. The current state of SRI in the world 
 
In recent years, SRI has developed into a mainstream investing strategy, particularly in 
Europe and in the United States. Yearly growth rates of 10% to 50% in western nations 
are common and well documented by proponents of SRI. As mentioned by Renneboog et 
al. (2008b), the early 2000’s saw a mainstreaming of SRI as national governments picked 
up on the trend and enforced regulations, which in turn facilitated an accelerated growth 
of SRI assets. Further events underlying the importance and SRI, and providing evidence 
for a mainstreaming of it, are given by Humphrey, Lee, and Shen (2012). The authors 
report that stock exchanges around the world, such as for example in Sweden, South Af-
rica, India, France, and Thailand, introduced formal- and voluntary measures of ESG dis-
closure and reporting guidelines for companies. Additionally, recent mergers and acqui-
sitions further highlight the importance and mainstreaming of the topic among data pro-
viders. The increased demand for SRI and ESG related data saw the financial data pro-
vider MSCI taking over RiskMetrics, which beforehand acquired Innovest Strategic 
Value Advisors and KLD Research & Analytics, which were both well-known and fre-
quently used ESG data providers in academic literature. Additionally, Thomson Reuters 
and Bloomberg, both major financial data providers, similarly acquired ASSET4 and 
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New Energy Finance respectively, to satiate the increased demand for SRI related data. 
(Humphrey et al. 2012) 
 
A Furthermore noteworthy trend is that various influential organizations and associations 
are promoting-, and lobbying for an increased awareness for SRI, thus further facilitating 
a growth of it. For example the United Nations supported “Principle for Responsible In-
vestment” (PRI), the world’s leading proponent of SRI, created a framework lunched in 
2006 to encourage the integration of SRI into the business and investment practices of 
institutional investors. Currently, PRI has 1750 signatories from over 50 countries, rep-
resenting an amount of 70$ trillion USD under management. Signatories commit them-
selves to adhere the organizations six principles, which are: 1) To incorporate ESG issues 
into the analysis and investment process, 2) To incorporate ESG issues into ownership 
policies and practices, 3) To seek proper ESG disclosure by entities in which they invest, 
4) To promote SRI and ESG issues within the investment industry, 5) To work together 
to enhance the effectiveness of the principles, and 6) To each report on their own activities 
and progress towards the implementation of the principles. (PRI 2016) 
 
Further proponents of SRI include among others: the Sustainable Investment Forum of 
the US (USSIF) and -Europe (Eurosif), the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 
(GSIA), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For 
example, the current state of SRI in the United States is addressed by USSIF, an organi-
zation whose mission it is to propagate SRI and realize a “shift of investment practices 
towards sustainability, … long-term investment and the generation of positive social and 
environmental impacts” (USSIF 2016). In their biennial report on SRI in the US, USSIF 
(2016) notes that the demand for SRI assets continues to grow, as the total amount of US 
assets under management that integrate SRI strategies, grew by 33% from $6.57 trillion 
in 2014, to $8.72 trillion in 2016. A trend unbroken since the early 2000’s according to 
USSIF (2016). 
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Figure 1. SRI-Assets under management in the US (USSIF 2016a: 12). 
 
However, this trend is not confided to the US alone. Eurosif (2016) documents the current 
status of SRI in Europe, which in their analysis is compromised of the countries of Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Additionally, the Global Investment Alliance (GSIA 
2016) gathers data on the status of current SRI trends from other member organizations 
in Canada, Australia & New Zealand, Japan, and greater Asia without Japan.  
 
The following graphics taken from GSIA’s (2016) Global Sustainable Investment Review 
are intended to showcase the numbers and proportions on the current status of SRI in the 
world, providing a better overview for the recent development of SRI assets in different 
regions around the globe. 
 
 
Figure 2. Growth of SRI Assets by Region 2014-2016 (GSIA 2016: 7). 
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Figure 3. Proportion of Global SRI Assets by Region (GSIA 2016: 8). 
 
According to GSIA (2016), SRI themed assets in Europe grew only by 12% from 2014 
to 2016, compared to the US growth of 33%. However, reaching a volume of $12.04 
trillion, SRI assets under management in Europe still outrank the US in volume. Further 
information that can be taken from figure one, is the fact that the growth trend for SRI 
seen in the US and Europe is occurring on a global scale. This can be seen in the total 
assets under management integrating SRI strategies worldwide, which grew from $18.28 
trillion in 2014, to $22.89 trillion in 2016. An increase of about 25% in only two years. 
However, while regions such as Canada, Australia & New Zealand, and Japan saw im-
pressive growth grates of 50%, 250%, and over 6600% respectively, the regional com-
bined SRI asset volume of these three regions accounts to less than 5% on a global scale. 
Nevertheless, since SRI is still in the process of spreading globally and becoming a full-
fledged mainstream investment strategy in many markets, and many regions in greater 
Asia are still considered developing financial markets, the growth trend of the global vol-
ume in SRI assets can be expected to continue to grow in the coming years. 
 
Breaking down the ownership structure of SRI assets, Figure four, which was taken from 
GSIA (2016), shows that institutional investors are holding the majority of SRI themed 
assets. However, from 2014 to 2016 the ownership of institutional investors decreased by 
25 
 
around 12%. The shift from institutional to retail investors signals a change, and possibly 
the next step as the driving factor behind the exponential growth of SRI. A shift from 
mostly institutional investors such as pension funds and insurers, to the more diverse 
group of retail investors. 
 
 
Figure 4. Assets held by Institutional & Retail Investors (GSIA 2016: 10). 
 
Nevertheless, while retail investors are gaining a greater share, with almost 75% of all 
SRI themed assets, institutional investors still dominate most markets, and will continue 
to drive the growth of SRI in the foreseeable future. According to Renneboog et al. 
(2008b), this can be explained by the regulatory background of the early 2000’s, which 
made SRI especially interesting and relevant for institutional investors. In their paper, the 
authors highlight some of the regulatory SRI initiatives undertaken by national govern-
ments and pension funds, which acted as forerunners and role models. For example, the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS), the largest pension fund 
in the world, and the Dutch Pension Fund for Public Employees (ABP), the biggest pen-
sion fund in Europe, engage in SRI. Furthermore, besides the tax advantages for invest-
ments in the renewable energy industry introduced by the German and Dutch govern-
ments and the pension act amendment passed in the UK, in 2001 the governments of 
Australia, Belgium and France introduced regulations which encourage listed companies 
to publish annual reports containing their SRI engagement, as well as disclose the extent 
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to which SRI and ESG criteria were taken into account. A trend which was followed by 
other countries such as Italy, Germany, Sweden and the US in the following years.   
 
As evident by the shown numbers and figures, SRI is an up-to date topic that is highly 
relevant and attracts a substantial amount of wealth, as well as attention by both national 
and supra-national regulators and policymakers, institutional investors, and value-driven 
investors. 
 
2.1.4. The tools of SRI 
 
The investment strategies employed in SRI are many, and vary according to religious, 
cultural, or geographical background. Typically SRI related investment strategies employ 
various screens to analyze possible investment assets. These screens can be universally 
divided into two groups: negative-, and positive screens. However, as the concept of SRI 
evolved, so did the screens, enhancing the practices over time. 
 
Negative screens are the most basic form of SRI strategies, and are deeply rooted in the 
religious origin of SRI. Negative screens typically aim at excluding certain stocks or 
whole industries from the investment universe, based on Environmental-, Social-, Ethi-
cal-, or Corporate Governance criteria and values. For example, a negative screen could 
be applied on the S&P 500 by excluding all so-called “sin-stocks” such as stocks related 
to alcohol, gambling, adult entertainment, and tobacco. Another negative screening ap-
proach would be to simply exclude stocks based on poor score performance in Environ-
mental, Social, or Corporate Governance related areas, before considering financial- and 
risk relevant criteria to construct a suitable portfolio. (Renneboog et al. 2008b) 
 
A more recent strategy in SRI revolves around the practice of positive screens. Positive 
screens aim at selecting assets that provide superior standards and ESG scores. Contrary 
to negative screens, positive screens do no limit the investment universe through exclu-
sions of whole industries. This can be seen in the popular “Best-In-Class” approach, 
which goal it is to select companies that show superior ESG scores in relation to their 
27 
 
(industry) peers. As such, a positive screen approach does not exclude stocks of contro-
versial industries, as long as they are the top of their peers in ESG related matters. 
(Renneboog et al. 2008b) 
 
Renneboog et al. (2008b), describe negative and positive screens in their paper as the first 
and second generation in the evolution of SRI screens. The third generation of SRI screens 
is considered to be the combination of both, negative and positive screens. Such an ap-
proach might be for example to actively seek out firms that promote human rights stand-
ards, while at the same time avoiding any firm complicit in human right violations. Con-
tinuing the evolution of SRI screens, the fourth generation takes up the approach of using 
both negative and positive screens form the third generation, and combines it with the 
strategy of shareholder activism. Shareholder activism aims at influencing a company’s 
action through dialogue with the management, or through investors voting rights. This 
means that SRI investors actively seek out to positively influence a firm in regards to 
ESG issues. (Renneboog et al. 2008b) 
 
As of 2016, organizations such as the GSIA, USSIF, Eurosif, and PRI identify and de-
scribe between six to seven SRI strategies in total. These strategies, while varying slightly 
according to framework, can be used as individual investment strategies, or in any form 
of combination. The following figure taken from Eurosif (2016) shows the different clas-
sifications introduced to the frameworks in 2012. 
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Figure 5. Classification of SRI Strategies by Different Organizations (Eurosif 2016: 9). 
 
Exclusions, norms-based screening, Best-in-Class selection, ESG integration, and En-
gagement, all reflect the previously described four generations of SRI screens. The newest 
generations of SRI strategies are “Sustainability themed investments”, and “Impact in-
vesting”. According to Eurosif (2016), the SRI strategy of Sustainability themed invest-
ments picked up in recent years thanks to events such as the UN Climate Change Confer-
ence in 2015, and the rising importance of topics such as climate change and renewable 
energy. The strategy revolves around screening for industries and firms with strong links 
to sustainable development topics, such energy efficiency, waste management, water 
management and renewable energy. Similar to Sustainability themed investments, Impact 
investing is a niche trend which came into existence recently, and aims at creating a pos-
itive impact across sustainable developments. Contrary to the formerly mentioned ap-
proach however, which aims at furthering sustainable development technologies, Impact 
investing aims at creating superior financial returns (Eurosif 2016).  
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Figure 6. Regional Share, by Asset Weight, in Global use of SRI Strategies (GSIA 2016: 
11). 
 
Preferred SRI strategies of investors can vary significantly on the regional level as the 
figure showcases, further emphasizing the variation that exists within SRI. For example, 
Europe, which holds over 52% of all global SRI assets, also holds almost 75% of all 
global assets in the category negative screening, and almost 90% of all global assets under 
norms-based screening, making both SRI strategies the most popular in that region. Fur-
thermore, it is possible to infer that the US holds the major share of global assets involved 
in ESG integration and impact investing. Meanwhile, although Canada only accounts for 
roughly 5% of all global SRI assets under management, the country accounts for over 
20% of the global share of best-in-class assets. 
 
 
2.2. Literature review 
 
Following the exceptional growth of SRI, a heighted academic interest in the topic 
emerged. While there are many academic papers that aim at explaining the true nature of 
SRI and try to more closely define the term, such as for example Sparkes (2001), and 
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Eccles & Viviers (2011), this paper is in line with the strand of scientific research that 
aims at analyzing the financial performance of SRI. This strand of research usually aims 
at analyzing whether the integration of SRI into investment decisions invokes costs that 
are different compared to conventional investments, or whether a SRI strategy affects the 
financial performance of investments (Revelli & Viviani 2015). 
 
The academic debate on the performance of SRI closely mirrors the one conducted on the 
relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Corporate Social Perfor-
mance (CSP), and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP), in-between the 70’s and 90’s 
(Revelli & Viviani 2015). As previously mentioned, SRI is a facet of CSR. CSR is a 
company-level based concept, consisting of considerations aimed at enhancing firm per-
formance and stakeholder relations through investments in activities that are considered 
to improve social welfare (Perrini et al. 2011). Meanwhile SRI is an investor-level based 
concept, consisting of investors applying screens to seek out, or reject, firms based on 
their CSR engagement, either to capitalize on the expected superior firm performance, or 
because of personal values or law enforced regulations (Revelli & Viviani 2015). 
 
The following sub-chapters aim to provide a clearer picture on the multidimensional con-
cepts of CSR and SRI, and describe how they are connected in academic literature. The 
first sub-chapter will describe the evolution of CSR research from its earliest beginnings 
in 1972, up until to the results and conclusions of modern research on it. Furthermore, the 
chapter will describe the shift that occurred in CSR related research with the emergence 
of SRI. Following that, the second sub-chapter will analyze and describe the results of 
modern research on SRI. 
 
2.2.1. CSR, CFR, and the link to financial performance 
 
In academic literature, the term Corporate Social Responsibility, “CSR”, and Corporate 
Social Performance, “CSP”, are often used interchangeably. However, according to Bar-
nett (2007), as well as Perrini, Russo, Tencati & Vurro (2011) and earlier research, there 
is an important distinction between the two terms. Barnett (2007) states that CSP is in 
fact a summary, or snapshot, of a firms aggregated social performance at a point in time. 
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Meanwhile, CSR is stated by the author to be the investments in social activities over 
time that make up the CSP at a certain point in time. Hence, by investing in CSR activities, 
a firm is able to create a positive CSP. 
 
Early academic literature identified Corporate Social Responsibility as an important duty. 
However, the relationship between CSR and a firm’s financial performance remains com-
plex, with different views on the matter prevailing in historical academic research 
(McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis 1988). According to McGuire et al. (1988), based on 
the research of Vance (1975), Moskowitz (1972), and Cornell & Shapiro (1987) among 
others, three different views on the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Corporate Financial Performance are debated in academic research. 
 
The first view on CSR states that, when choosing to implement CSR activities, such as 
establishing environmental protection procedures, or promoting community develop-
ment, firms limit their strategic alternatives and forgo investment opportunities. By ad-
hering to CSR principles, firms incur higher costs and limit their strategic alternatives. 
Thus, firms must face a trade-off between financial performance and socially responsible 
actions, as the latter incurs costs that put the firm at an economic disadvantage compared 
to its peers that refuse to implement CSR measures. (Vance 1975, McGuire et al. 1988) 
 
The second view on the CSP-CFP link in early academic research suggests a positive 
relation. Stating that the costs of implementing CSR measures are minimal, and firms can 
expect benefits such as an increased employee morale, productivity, and customer good-
will. Furthermore, through the perception of having high CSR standards, a firm may im-
prove its standing with banks, investors, and the government, enjoying economic benefits 
such an increased access to capital. (Moskowitz 1972, McGuire et al. 1988) 
 
Lastly, the third view suggests that CSR neither adds-, nor destroys financial perfor-
mance, as the substantial costs for CSR activities are offset by a reduction in other costs. 
However, CSR is nevertheless an important concept for firms, as stakeholder theory sug-
gests that firms must not only satisfy shareholders, but also stakeholders who hold less 
32 
 
explicit claims such as for example product- or service quality (Cornell & Shapiro 1987, 
McGuire et al. 1988).  
 
Besides the financial performance, another important aspect that was already considered 
in early academic research on CSR, is trust. McGuire et al. (1988) describe, based on 
Alexander & Buchholz (1978), that stake- and shareholder might see the implementation 
of CSR activities as a measure of management skill. Thus, an increase in CSR might get 
reflected in a more positive image of the company in the eyes of share- and stakeholders, 
resulting in benefits such as increased trust in the firm to honor its commitments. On the 
contrary, a low level of CSR, or a decrease of CSR activities, might correlate with a low 
level of trust, or a decrease thereof respectively. 
 
Early empirical research on CSR is plagued by several problems limiting the comparabil-
ity of results. Problems are among others, the varying methods to measure social- and 
economic performance, the incomparability of the analyzed time periods, as well as a lack 
of a clearly defined theory and key terms. Other mentioned problems include sampling 
problems, in addition to the failure to control for factors such as: risk, research and de-
velopment expenses, and intangible assets such as human capital and reputation. (Barnett 
2007, Perrini et al. 2011)  
 
Since the days of early research on the CSP-CFP link, more than four decades have 
passed, and the number of studies investigating the relationship between Corporate Social 
Performance and Corporate Financial Performance has grown. Over time, the newer stud-
ies have addressed the problems mentioned above and improved on them, offering 
stronger theories, better analytical methods, and control mechanism for earlier unexplain-
able or omitted variables (Barnett 2007). The conflicting views on the impact of CSR 
activities on CFP however remain at large the same, with modern research outcomes mir-
roring earlier results, leaving the debate between CSR proponents and opponents un-
solved. Nevertheless, company commitment to CSR practices, -documentation and -dis-
closure continues to grow, as new concepts and tools to evaluate CSR are being created 
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(Perrini et al. 2011). Nowadays, CSR reporting is seen as a standard among most compa-
nies and industries (KPMG 2017). However, while the popularity of CSR is growing, the 
conflicting views on it remain the same. 
 
Critics of this practice still see it as having a negative impact on firm performance. For 
these critics, engaging in CSR activates is not the purpose of a firm, but should rather be 
left to the government. Following the neoclassical maxim as propagated by Friedman 
(1970), critics argue that CSR represents unnecessary costs that may lead to competitive 
disadvantages, and that the money should rather be used to improve firm efficiency or 
returned to shareholders (Barnett 2007, Perrini et al. 2011).  
 
Proponents of CSR, which according to Perrini et al. (2011) make up the larger group, 
continue to propagate that CSR is in a firms best interest, as it facilitates competitive 
advantages. It is argued that CSR has a positive impact on firm performance, as an in-
crease in CSR activities leads to a decrease in transaction costs, due an improvement in 
trust and the resulting belief that a firm with a strong engagement in CSR will honor its 
commitments. (Barnett 2007, Perrini et al. 2011)  
 
Despite the improvement of the studies over the years, the modern view on the debate 
voices critique on both of the existing views on CSR. As Barnett (2007) mentions: 
“…twenty-five years of research has not produced a solution but, rather, isolated islands 
of partial insight about an unseen larger picture…”. Recent research suggested a shift in 
the prevailing academic approach to the topic, as CSP is too dependent on situational, and 
company individual elements. Instead of analyzing the link between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Financial Performance, modern CSR research should aim 
for reviewing the CSR-CFP debate with a focus on the modern stakeholder theory, first 
propagated by Freeman (1984). The aim should be to analyze the link between CSR en-
gagement and trust, to determine which aspects of CSR matter to which stakeholders. 
Additionally, with the mainstreaming of CSR practices, researchers should also be able 
to answer how to succeed in CSR (Barnett 2007, Perrini et al. 2011).  
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Accompanying this shift in CSR research was the emergence of SRI and the research 
thereof. As the research shifted away from analyzing the financial performance of CSR, 
analyses aimed at determining whether the new concept of SRI provided superior finan-
cial performance took over. Now academic research on financial performance tries to 
determine, whether SRI assets and -strategies are more profitable than conventional assets 
and investment strategies. Continuing, the next chapter will provide more insight into the 
SRI debate, and briefly mention how some aspects mirror the CSP-CFP debate. 
 
2.2.2. Academic literature on SRI and financial performance 
 
The majority of the academic research on SRI of the last decade is focused on analyzing 
whether the incorporation of SRI into investment decisions affects financial performance 
(Revelli & Viviani 2015). Similar to the earlier research on the CSR-CSP link, today’s 
SRI research yielded mixed results, indicated in three prevailing alternative hypotheses: 
 
The “Doing Good While Doing Well” (Statman & Glushkov 2009), or over-performance 
hypothesis, suggests that SRI investments generate excess returns that are higher than 
those of comparable conventional investments. Proponents of this hypothesis argue that 
firm with high ESG scores are less susceptible to potential additional costs caused by 
environmental disasters, corporate-, or social crises (Chan & Walter 2014). More specif-
ically, through adapting SRI friendly practices, firms are less likely to occur environmen-
tal fines and lawsuits, while they are additionally more likely to create high firm loyalty, 
increased sales, and lowered costs (McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis 1988; Sauer 1997; 
Auer 2016). Reversely, firms with low ESG scores may destroy value in the long term, 
by having a higher chance to be subjected to reputation losses, decreased sales, or court 
costs (Chan & Walter 2014). Another aspect attributed to a high performance in environ-
mental-, social-, or governance related issues, is managerial skill, which can also translate 
into better financial performance (Renneboog et al. 2008b). 
 
The “Doing Good but Not Well” (Statman & Glushkov 2009), or underperformance hy-
pothesis, follows the belief that investing in stocks of SRI-conform firms results in lower 
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expected returns, compared to investing in conventional stocks. Proponents of this hy-
pothesis state that by applying SRI strategies investors restrict their investment universe, 
which according to mean-variance theory, results in reduced diversification opportunities 
and a decreased portfolio performance (Belghitar, Clark & Deshmukh 2014; Chan & 
Walter 2014). More specifically, SRI screens may eliminate some otherwise profitable 
companies and industries, leaving smaller and more volatile firms as investment options 
(Auer 2016).  
 
The “No Effect” (Statman & Glushkov 2009) hypothesis states that SRI neither destroys, 
nor adds value, as the expected risk adjusted returns of SRI stocks equals those of con-
ventional stocks. This might be the case if the benefit generated through an increase in 
SRI activities increases a company’s costs by the same amount, resulting in company 
profitability to remain unaffected. On the other hand, if an increase in SRI activities only 
results in a greater increase of costs, company profitability may remain unaffected as long 
as SRI investors overestimate the firm value, or underestimate the real costs (Statman & 
Glushkov 2009, Revelli & Viviani 2015).  
 
Ultimately, whether SRI investments over-perform, underperform, or neither, is a ques-
tion answered by empirical research. For this reason, there is a great number of academic 
research that revolves around the analysis of the financial performance of SRI invest-
ments. Generally, this research can be divided into three categories: SRI stocks versus 
conventional stocks, SRI mutual funds versus conventional funds, and SRI indices versus 
conventional indices, which all partially yield conflicting evidence regarding the perfor-
mance of SRI. 
  
Empirical research that indicates a positive relationship between SRI and financial per-
formance, supporting the over-performance hypothesis, can be found for example in the 
papers of Derwall, Guenster, Bauer & Koedijk (2005), and Kempf & Osthoff (2007). 
Using multifactor asset pricing models such the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the 
authors show that a long-short strategy consisting of selling portfolios compromised of 
stocks with low ESG scores, and buying those with high scores, yields statistically sig-
nificant abnormal returns. Newer research using similar methods that also supports the 
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over-performance hypothesis can found with Chan & Walter (2014), who report a “green 
premium” for stocks of environmentally friendly firms. Similarly, Statman & Glushkov 
(2009) report significant abnormal returns following a best-in-class approach (screening 
for the best scores, regardless of industry), and using stocks sorted on their “social re-
sponsibility” scores. 
 
Empirical research that reports evidence for the hypothesis that SRI neither over-, nor 
underperforms, can be found for example with the papers of Renneboog, Ter Horst & 
Zhang (2008a), Bauer, Koedijk & Otten (2005), Kreander, Gray, Power, & Sinclair 
(2005), or Ferruz, Muñoz & Vargas (2012). All of the previously mentioned paper inves-
tigated the performance of SRI funds relative to conventional funds, however none found 
any statistical significant difference in performance. Providing similar evidence, but in-
vestigating indices rather than funds, are the papers by Schröder (2007) and Belghitar, 
Clark & Deshmukh (2014). In detail the latter two papers analyze whether SRI indices 
such as the FTSE4Good, the Domini Social, or the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, per-
form better than their conventional counterparts. However, neither paper found any sta-
tistical evidence for the over- or underperformance of SRI. 
 
Following the general analysis, the following part will in more detail analyze some of the 
mentioned papers, before providing evidence as to why there are so many conflicting 
results within the academic SRI research. 
 
Derwall, Guenster, Bauer & Koedijk (2005) investigate the question of SRI performance 
in their paper by sorting portfolios on an ESG measure called “eco-efficiency”. Eco-effi-
ciency is described by the authors as the ratio of the value a company adds, versus the 
waste a company produces. Using Innovest, nowadays MSCI, Derwall et al. (2005) ac-
quired the ESG data of 450 US companies, covering the period from May 1995 to May 
2003. Continuing, the authors proceeded to rank the companies according to their eco-
efficiency scores, and create two portfolios, each consisting of the highest (lowest) 30% 
stocks, which were rebalanced annually according to updated score information. Using 
the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, as well as the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, Derwall et al. (2005) find evidence that a portfolio consisting of the 
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most eco-efficient companies outperformed a portfolio of  the least eco-efficient ones 
over the 1995-2003 period. Moreover, this statistical significant return of six percent 
above the bottom portfolio, cannot be explained by differences in market sensitivity, in-
vestment style, or industry specific factors. The results furthermore remain significant in 
the presence of transaction costs, indicating that the integration of SRI into investment 
considerations can have a tremendous impact. 
 
Another paper that is in line with the over-performance hypothesis is the analysis con-
ducted by Kempf & Osthoff (2007). Similar to the approach used by Derwall et al. (2005), 
the authors investigate whether a trading strategy based on past ESG ratings and a top-
bottom approach leads to statistical significant abnormal returns. Using KLD, nowadays 
MSCI, Kempf & Osthoff (2007) acquire the ESG data for around 650 stocks which to-
gether compromise the investment universe of the S&P 500 and the DS 400 for a time 
period covering 1992 to the end of 2003. In detail, the authors acquired the score ratings 
for all of the sub-criteria compromising the categories of “community”, “diversity”, “em-
ployee relations”, “environmental”, “human rights”, and “product”, which they used to 
construct an overall, category individual score. Using these scores, the authors create 
portfolios consisting of the respective top (bottom) 10% of stocks, as well as one portfolio 
consisting of the combined average rating. A final portfolio is created by using a com-
bined negative and positive screening approach, to first drop all companies that are in-
volved in “controversial” business areas, before creating a portfolio on the combined av-
erage score over all categories. Using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to measure 
the performance of the respective portfolios, the authors find that investors can earn sta-
tistically significant abnormal returns by short selling the bottom portfolios, and going 
long in the top portfolios. Moreover, even considering transaction costs, the best-in-class 
approach yields a statistically significant alpha of 8.7% a year. 
 
Contrary to the evidence found in the papers of Derwall et al. (2005) and Kempf & 
Osthoff (2007), and conflicting with the view that a trading strategy based SRI can 
achieve substantial abnormal returns, the following papers by Renneboog, Ter Horst & 
Zhang (2008a) and Belghitar, Clark & Deshmukh (2014) show evidence that the returns 
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provided by SRI investments are not statistically different from the returns of conven-
tional investments. 
 
In their paper, Renneboog et al. (2008a), investigate the question whether the under- or 
over-performance hypothesis holds for SRI funds across the world. In detail, the authors 
investigate if SRI funds from 17 countries outperform their conventional counterparts 
over a period lasting from January 1991 to December 2003. Constructing their own data-
base, Renneboog et al. (2008a) compare the performance of 440 country specific SRI 
mutual funds with the performance of 16,036 conventional mutual funds across the world. 
Using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model, the authors find that SRI funds strongly underperform their benchmarks by -2.2% 
to -6.5%. However, except for SRI funds in France, Sweden, Ireland and Japan, this un-
derperformance is statistically not significant, providing evidence for the underperfor-
mance hypothesis, as well as the hypothesis that SRI neither destroys nor adds value. 
 
Another example refuting the over-performance hypothesis and thus providing further 
conflicting results, is the paper by Belghitar et al. (2014). Criticizing that earlier research 
usually limits itself to investigating performance using the CAPM, three-factor, or four-
factor model, Belghitar et al. (2014) examine SRI performance by applying the concept 
of Marginal Conditional Stochastic Dominance developed by Shalit & Yitzhaki (1994). 
Under the premise that investors are risk averse, the Marginal Conditional Stochastic 
Dominance concept, or MCSD, investigates which assets a risk averse investor prefers 
over another. By increasing the share of these superior, or “dominant” assets, risk averse 
investors can increase their utility. Belghitar et al. (2014) use the FTSE4Good index and 
its regional variations, the FTSE4Good-US, -UK, - EU, and –Global index, to compare 
them to conventional regional index counterparts, as well as general regional market in-
dices. Covering a sample period of 10 years, lasting from July 2001 to November 2010, 
the authors find that there is no statistical difference between the returns of SRI- and 
conventional indices in case of their mean and variance. However, conventional indices 
outperform their SRI counterparts in terms of higher skewness and lower kurtosis, indi-
cating that SRI indices have a lower financial utility. This finding is further supported by 
results indicating that the strategy of shorting an SRI index, and investing the proceeds in 
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a conventional one, significantly outperforms both indices separately. Ultimately, SRI 
underperforms according to the authors. 
 
A detailed overview of the various studies related to SRI performance can be found in the 
meta-studies of Renneboog et al. (2008a) and Revelli & Viviani (2015), both of which 
summarize, and give an overview of the results achieved in the analysis of the financial 
performance of SRI. Renneboog et al. (2008a) analyze the results of 16 papers that inves-
tigate the performance of SRI funds compared to conventional ones. However, the results 
mostly support the hypothesis that SRI neither over- nor underperforms, as the difference 
in returns between the two categories of funds is statistically not significant. Contrary to 
Renneboog et al. (2008a), Revelli & Viviani (2015) examine 85 studies over a period of 
20 years, which are additionally not solely limited to the comparison of SRI funds with 
conventional ones. Revelli & Viviani (2015) find evidence for positive-, negative-, and 
neutral relationships between SRI and financial performance, leading the authors to con-
clude similar to Renneboog et al. (2008a) seven years prior that on average SRI globally 
neither over- nor underperforms. However, the various results are very heterogeneous and 
highly dependent on the chosen methods, data, and geographical location, indicating a 
lack of consensus in the field of empirical SR study. 
 
In light of this lack of conclusive evidence regarding the financial performance of SRI, it 
is necessary to analyze the limitations shared between the previous studies, and examine 
possible explanations for the heterogeneity in results. As evident from the meta-studies 
by Renneboog et al. (2008a) and Revelli & Viviani (2015), a great number of studies 
revolve around comparing the performance of SRI mutual funds with the performance of 
conventional funds or unrestricted benchmark portfolios. All these studies have in com-
mon that they suggest SRI fund returns are not statistically different from conventional 
fund returns. 
 
According to Statman & Glushkov (2009) and Auer (2016), while these studies are useful, 
they provide little evidence about the actual returns of stocks of companies that are heav-
ily engaged in SRI matters. Additionally, these studies suffer from several drawbacks. 
First, evidence found by Wimmer (2013) indicates that funds change their status over 
40 
 
time, which means that funds initially considered SRI funds may lose their status as such, 
despite being continually labelled, and/or listed as SRI funds. In detail, Wimmer (2013) 
reports that ESG-score persistence in funds is terminated after approximately two to three 
years due to changes in the holdings of the fund. Second, Kempf & Osthoff (2007) as 
reported by Auer (2016), and Statman & Glushkov (2009), mention that a number of 
confounding effects create gaps between the returns of mutual funds. These gaps in turn 
make it difficult to rely on fund performance to analyze the impact of SRI. In detail, fund 
performance does not merely rely on the underlying securities, but also management fees 
and managerial skill. Finally, according to Auer (2016) while most studies use Jensen’s 
alpha to measure the risk adjusted performance, this measure has its limitations. The au-
thor elaborates that Jensen’s Alpha is a measure of performance for well-diversified port-
folios. However, some SRI funds apply negative screening procedures, thus limiting their 
investment universe, and in turn their diversification potential. Hence, the results acquired 
by fund level comparison studies have to be handled with care. 
 
Similarly, Statman & Glushkov (2009) also criticize the use of index level comparisons 
to determine the performance of SRI. Although indices are free of the confounding effects 
of mutual funds, such as management fees and managerial skill, index level comparisons 
suffer from other limitations that prohibit achieving a clear picture of SRI performance. 
First, there is much overlapping between stocks listed in SRI indices and stocks listed in 
conventional indices. For example, the Domini 400 Social Index shares roughly 250 
stocks with the S&P 500, and thus a comparison likely underestimates the difference be-
tween SRI- and conventional stocks. Second, screening criteria and applied weights differ 
among indices. For example, the Calvert Social Index assigns relatively high weights to 
the Governance dimension, while the Domini 400 Social Index (DS 400) assigns rela-
tively high weights to the Environmental dimension. Additionally, while both the DS 400 
and the Calvert Social Index limit themselves by negatively screening for tobacco firms, 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) only applies the best-in-class approach, thus 
allowing tobacco firms to be part of its investment universe. (Statman & Glushkov 2009) 
 
Regarding the limitations above, it becomes clear that only a stock level analysis is suit-
able to determine the performance of SRI. Reinvestigating the previous literature under 
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this premise however does not provide the wished for clarity, as the results provided by 
literature focusing on stock level comparisons are still mixed, as seen when comparing 
the results of Kempf & Osthoff (2007), Statman & Glushkov (2009), Chan & Walter 
(2014), and Auer (2016) among others. 
 
Although the results are mixed, one observation that can be made when comparing stock 
level SRI performance analyses is that studies that limit themselves to earlier time peri-
ods, more often report a positive relationship between SRI and performance, as well as 
generally higher, and more significant abnormal returns compared to later periods. This 
observation might indicate a learning effect, such as shown in the papers of Borgers, 
Derwall, Koedijk & Ter Horst (2013) and Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang (2013), both of which 
report that the abnormal returns vanished over time, as market participants learned to 
price SRI correctly. In detail, Borgers et al. (2013) analyzed whether portfolios con-
structed on ESG scores gathered from KLD, nowadays MSCI, yield any abnormal signif-
icant return over the 1992 – 2009 period. The authors find that a portfolio compromised 
of the highest scores provides statistically significant abnormal returns, and outperforms 
a portfolio compromised of the lowest scores during the 1992 – 2004 period. After this 
period however, the statistical significance ceased to exist, as investor attention grew and 
errors in investor expectations were reduced. Similar, Bebchuk et al. (2013) investigate 
in a related study, whether portfolios sorted on a corporate governance index (G-index) 
created by Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, (2003) yield any abnormal returns during the 1990 
– 2008 period. Bebchuk et al. (2013) find that while the Governance dimension continues 
to be related to firm value and operating profits, the correlation with abnormal returns 
only lasted from 1990 to 2001. More specifically, portfolios compromised of stocks of 
companies with “good” Governance yielded significant positive abnormal returns until 
2001, before they stopped doing so in the following periods. Investigating earning an-
nouncements, the authors conclude similar to Borgers et al. (2013) that the abnormal re-
turns only existed due mispricing on behalf of the market, and that investors over time 
learned to price factors such as the (ES)G factor correctly, resulting in abnormal returns 
ceasing to exist. 
 
42 
 
Concluding all evidence gathered so far, to determine if SRI over-performs, underper-
forms, or does neither, it is best to use a stock level analysis. Furthermore, to make sure 
all possible confounding effect that plague other studies are addressed, it is advised to 
construct portfolios using the best-in-class approach, least the possible investment uni-
verse gets limited. However, when investigating studies following this approach, the re-
sults can be still mixed, depending on the investigated period. As Bebchuk et al (2013) 
and Borgers et al. (2013) reported, portfolios constructed on ESG information only 
yielded abnormal significant positive returns until 2001, before they vanished in subse-
quent years. Taking into consideration this learning effect, it is possible to conclude that 
investors learned to price the information contained in ESG scores correctly, and subse-
quently SRI does neither over- nor underperform in this day and age. While the above 
made conclusion seems to be the case, two recently published papers cast doubt upon this. 
  
In his paper, Auer (2016) shows that portfolios created by screening for high ESG scores 
still provide significant positive abnormal returns in Europe, over the 2004 to 2012 pe-
riod. In detail, Auer (2016) applies a never before used set of ESG ratings for the Euro-
pean market acquired from Sustainalytics to create stock portfolios sorted on Environ-
mental, Social, and Governance scores respectively, as well as a portfolio based on a 
combined average weighted ESG score. Using the Sharpe ratio and the LW bootstrap test 
proposed by Ledoit & Wolf (2008), Auer (2016) finds that when using cut-off rates of 
5% to 25% the portfolios sorted on Governance scores as well as the combined ESG score 
outperform the benchmark portfolio, while the portfolios sorted on Environmental and 
Social scores neither over-, nor underperform. Furthermore, the G score portfolios show 
significant abnormal returns compared to the benchmark portfolio consisting of all rated 
stocks. This indicates that stocks of companies with higher G-scores outperform those 
with lower scores. Thus, Auer (2016) provides evidence for the hypothesis that SRI can 
still over-perform after the 2001 period, despite the presence of a learning effect, as the 
European market is the biggest market for SRI, and had the comparably same time as the 
US market to incorporate SRI information. 
 
The second paper indicating that it is still possible to generate abnormal returns with SRI 
despite a learning effect, is the recently published paper by Lins, Servaes and Tamayo 
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(2017). Lins et al. (2017) empirically analyze the relationship between high ratings in 
CSR, trust, and financial performance, and show that a positive relationship still exists. 
Using stakeholder theory as foundation, which indicates that high CSR ratings correlate 
with high trust, and ESG data from MSCI, the authors analyze the performance of SRI in 
the low trust environment of the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009. The financial crisis of 
2008 to 2009 was an event that caused public trust in companies to decline drastically. 
As reported by the Edelman (2009) Trust Barometer, during this period global trust in 
companies declined on average by 62%, and in the US by 77%. Lins et al. (2017) argue 
that if a high engagement in CSR activities, proxied by high ESG scores, does indeed 
facilitate and proxy trust, the increased trust should pay off in low trust periods. Examin-
ing the performance of over 1600 non-financial firms during the period of August 2008 
to March 2009, and using CSR data received from MSCI, the authors show that firms that 
entered the period with high ESG ratings significantly outperformed their peers with low 
ESG ratings by four to seven percent in stock returns. Furthermore, Lins et al. (2017) 
show that the result can be replicated for the period of the dot-com crisis in the early 
2000’s, which similar to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 lead to a sharp decline in trust.  
 
Summarizing the evidence gathered from the above two thesis: Auer (2016) shows that it 
is still possible for SRI to provide statistically significant abnormal returns under normal 
circumstances nowadays, while Lins et al. (2017) provide evidence that SRI does over-
perform during crises periods. Concluding, the author of this thesis deems it warranted to 
once again reexamine the performance of SRI in the US, by using a new set of ESG data, 
as well as new methods.  
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3. DATA 
 
This chapter explains the data source and the data employed in this thesis. Section 3.1 in 
particular aims at describing the various ESG data providers mentioned in academic lit-
erature, and the validity of their respective ESG scores. Furthermore, the chapter will 
describe the data provider chosen for this thesis, and explain how ESG scores are con-
structed. Continuing, chapter 3.2 describes and analyzes the data used in this thesis in 
greater detail, and provides first summary statistics for the ESG score distribution over 
the whole sample period.  
 
 
3.1. Data sources and ESG score validity 
 
Closely intertwined with the increase of public interest in issues such as climate change, 
business ethics, diversity, and human rights, is the increase of investor and company in-
terest in topics such as Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Responsible Invest-
ments. Accompanying this heightened interest, the number of rating agencies specialized 
in analyzing and compounding information, to quantify these values for companies and 
investors, increased. In practice, rating agencies use company related information such as 
company fillings and -websites, annual reports, media- and NGO reports, to gather infor-
mation on, and quantify numerous ESG sub-categories, which are then aggregated into 
single Environmental-, Social-, Governance-, and combined ESG scores. (Auer 2016; 
Thomson Reuters 2017a) 
 
When working with ESG data, there are various viable data sources referred to in litera-
ture. The most prominent source of ESG data featured in academic literature is “MSCI 
ESG STATS” (MSCI). MSCI is the successor to “Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Re-
search & Analytics” (KLD), another ESG data provider that is frequently quoted as a 
source in finance related academic literature that analyzes the performance of SRI. Ex-
amples for papers that use data from MSCI, or one of its predecessors, are Derwall et al. 
(2005, 2011), Kempf & Osthoff (2007), and Borgers et al. (2013), among many others. 
Other but less frequently used sources of ESG data that are mentioned in literature are 
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“Thomson Reuters ASSET4”, called ASSET4 henceforward, and the Europe based data 
provider “Global Engagement Service” (GES). 
 
A paper by Semenova and Hassel (2015), analyzes the validity of the Environmental rat-
ings provided by the aforementioned three data source providers MSCI, ASSET4, and 
GES. In order to do so, the authors examine the empirical relationship between- and 
across the provided environmental strength and weakness scores, to assess the level of 
similarity. Semenova and Hassel (2015) conclude that based on the convergent validity 
approach, the environmental metrics provided by the three agencies are highly correlated 
and converge on each other, which indicates that all three data providers offer similar 
suitable data for empirical analyses. 
 
Due to accessibility restrictions, and the fact that ASSET4 ESG data is only rarely quoted 
compared to the predominant MSCI data in academic literature, while offering the same 
level of suitability, this thesis will make use of Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG data, 
ensuring academic literature is enriched by providing additional insight into the SRI de-
bate by using a different data source. 
 
Thomson Reuters’ Datastream is one of the world’s largest sources of financial related 
information. According to Thomson Reuters (2017b), with data from 178 exchanges cov-
ering over 90 emerging and developed countries, as well as a minimum of 20 years pricing 
history for equities in major markets, Datastream offers a suitable breadth and depth of 
equity data, necessary to conduct a suitable analysis. Furthermore, with ASSET4, Thom-
son Reuters offers one of the most comprehensive ESG score databases, covering more 
than 6000 companies and over 400 ESG measures, going as far back as the year 2002 
(Thomson Reuters 2017a). 
 
ASSET4 ESG scores are designed to measure a company’s relative ESG performance 
compared to its peers. To do so, Thomson Reuters uses publicly available data such as 
company disclosures, and media- and NGO reports, to capture over 400 company level 
ESG metrics to conduct a detailed company assessment. Considering comparability, data 
availability, and industry relevance, the 178 most relevant data points are then chosen for 
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the scoring process. Continuing, these 178 data points are further grouped into ten cate-
gories, each related to one of the three pillars: “Environmental”, “Social”, or “Govern-
ance”. For example, metrics that are grouped in the categories of “Resource Use” and 
“Emissions”, relate to the Environmental pillar, metrics grouped in the categories of 
“Product Responsibility” and “Human Rights” relate to the Social pillar, and metrics 
grouped in the categories of “Management” and “Shareholders” relate to the Governance 
pillar. The final ESG scores are then calculated by percentile rank scoring, which consid-
ers the amount of companies that are worse and equal to the analyzed one, as well as all 
companies in the sample that have no scoring at all. These, in accordance with the fiscal 
year annually updated ESG scores, can thus rank from 0 to 100, which are meant to be 
interpreted as percentile values, reflecting how well (high score), or bad (low score), a 
company’s ESG performance is relative to its peers. (Thomson Reuters 2017a) 
 
 
3.2. Data description 
 
The following part will explain the data employed in this thesis in greater detail, as well 
as provide a first descriptive statistic regarding the ASSET4 ESG score distribution over 
the whole sample period. 
 
The from Thomson Reuter’s Datastream retrieved data consists of two parts.  The first 
part of the data consists of the monthly, end-of-the-month prices of all stocks that are 
listed in the S&P 500, each year from January 2003 to January 2017. This results in over 
77,000 monthly observations, spanning 168 months over a 14 year period, covering 892 
companies that are, or were during this period, part of the S&P 500 investment universe. 
The second part of the retrieved data consists of the yearly, year-end ESG scores corre-
sponding to the listed companies. The overall sample size of this thesis is limited by ESG 
scores not being available for the years prior to 2002, as well as past 2016. 
 
The following figure showcases the overall distribution of ESG scores over the whole 14 
year sample period. The respective y-axis for each histogram represents the amount of 
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companies that exhibit a certain score, while the respective x-axis represents the individ-
ual score that was achieved, ranking from zero to 100. 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of ESG scores over the whole sample period. 
 
The histogram for the Environmental score shows that many companies exhibit very high 
scores, around the 90th percentile, as well as very low scores, around the 10th to 20th 
percentiles. Meanwhile, only comparable few companies are located between the 30th 
and 80th percentile. This distribution might indicate that companies either tend to fully 
commit themselves to the Environmental dimension, and have a fairly high Environmen-
tal score, or tend to omit the Environmental dimension, resulting in a fairly low score 
performance. Additionally, as the sample does not differentiate between industries in the 
data, another possible explanation for this distribution might stem from the fact that 
“dirty” industries such as oil, or industrials, tend to have lower scores than “clean” indus-
tries such as financials, or information technology. This might indicate that there is a high 
number of “dirty” and “clean” industries in the S&P 500. 
 
Governance Score 
Social Score Environmental Score 
Combined ESG Score 
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The distribution in the Social dimension shows that scores are fairly even distributed, 
with a tendency for more companies to have a score around the 90th percentile. Continu-
ing, the Governance score distribution indicates that the major share of all companies 
commits themselves to uphold good Governance standards, as indicated by the fact that 
most companies are situated between the 70th and 90th percentile. This however might 
not be surprising, as good Corporate Governance as a value is older in comparison to the 
Environmental and Social dimensions. Furthermore, good Corporate Governance is an 
important value across all industrial sectors. Finally, the combined ESG score represents 
the equally weighted average across the three individual scores. The ESG histogram in-
dicates that more companies tend to have higher scores over all three categories, than 
lower scores. 
 
Supporting the above observations is the following table, containing the descriptive sta-
tistics of the ESG scores. The table spans the whole sample period, consisting of 6970 
year-end firm individual ESG score observations. As can be seen, with a mean score of 
around 77, the Governance scores of companies tend to be on average 20 points higher 
than the Environmental, and Social scores. Additionally, as observed in the histogram, 
companies’ Social scores exhibit a tendency to be closer to the higher percentile ranks, 
which is indicated with a mean score of 56 and a median score of 59. Meanwhile the 
distribution of Environmental scores tends to be fairly even with a mean score of 53, 
which is the results of many companies exhibiting either high- or low scores. 
 
 
Table 1. This table represents the descriptive statistic of the score distribution over the 
whole sample period from January 2003 to January 2017. The sample consists of 6970 
year-end firm individual score ratings per category. “E”,”S”, and “G” represent the En-
vironmental-, Social-, and Governance dimensions respectively. “ESG” represents the 
equally weighted average over the three individual scores. 
 Mean Median   Max   Min Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
E Scores 52.940 54.365 97.480 8.260 31.898 -0.012 1.338 
S Scores 56.062 59.230 98.930 3.530 28.115 -0.211 1.717 
G Scores 76.929 80.530 97.910 2.510 15.858 -1.485 5.856 
ESG 
Scores 
61.977 64.250 97.990 5.360 24.566 -0.217 1.718 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The following chapter revolves around the methods employed in this thesis. In particular, 
the first part of this chapter will explain how the portfolios used in the analysis were 
created, while the second part will explain the model that was employed in the perfor-
mance analyzation process. Furthermore, first descriptive statistics of the created portfo-
lios will be examined in tables two and three. 
 
The aim of this thesis’s empirical part is to analyze whether incorporating SRI consider-
ations into the portfolio creation process has any measureable impact on returns. In more 
detail, the goal is to analyze the performance of a selection of portfolios, created by 
screening the stocks in S&P 500 investment universe for their Environmental-, Social-, 
and Governance scores. In order to measure this performance, this thesis will employ the 
five-factor asset pricing model propagated by Fama and French (2015), in four distinct 
tests. 
 
The first test conducted in this thesis covers a data sample compromised of all stocks in 
the S&P 500 investment universe, spanning a period of 14 years, lasting from January 
2003 to January 2017. This represents a sample of 168 months and over 77,000 monthly 
return observations. Furthermore, this sample covers 892 companies that are, or were 
during this period, listed in the S&P 500. Continuing, using the five-factor asset pricing 
model, this first test will determine if a best-in-class approach consisting of yearly re-
balanced portfolios of the 25% highest scored stocks yields any abnormal returns. Addi-
tionally, this first test will further analyze whether a long-short approach of buying (sell-
ing) the portfolios consisting of the highest (lowest) scored 25% stocks, yields abnormal 
returns. 
 
The second test conducted in this paper aims at investigating whether portfolios created 
in the same fashion as during the first test, yield any abnormal return during the financial 
crisis period in the US. In detail, this second analysis investigates if a set of portfolios 
consisting of either the 25% best or worst ESG stocks, as well as the difference between 
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the top and bottom portfolios, resulted in statistically significant abnormal returns during 
the 20 months period lasting from August 2007 to March 2009. 
 
Furthermore, following Lins et al. (2017) who report that high ESG firms performed sig-
nificantly better than low ESG firms during the latter part of the financial crisis, a third 
and fourth test will be conducted using the same methods and portfolio creation processes 
as before. Based on a subsample of the financial crisis period, the third test covers the 
time span of 12 months, lasting from the beginning of the financial crisis in August 2007 
to July 2008, a period marked by a sharp decline in the availability of credit as described 
by Lins et al. (2017). The fourth and final test will cover the remaining time span of eight 
months, lasting from August 2008 to March 2009. This latter period of the financial crisis 
is described by Lins et al. (2017) as marked by a sharp decline in market wide trust, as 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy occurred in September 2008, while the S&P 500 hit its 
all-time crisis low in March 2009. 
 
 
4.1. Portfolio construction & descriptive statistics 
 
The portfolio creation process follows the logic that portfolios are created using either a 
positive (best-in-class), or a negative (worst-in-class), screening approach at the begin-
ning of the year, to determine the best and worst ESG stocks. In detail, the stocks are 
sorted at the beginning of each year by their individual E, S, and G-scores, ranging from 
highest scored, to lowest scored stock. Following, eight portfolios are created. Two port-
folios for each of the individual ESG dimensions, consisting of the highest and lowest 
rated 25% of stocks respectively, as well as two portfolios created in the same fashion on 
a combined ESG score. These portfolios are constructed with the information available 
at the beginning of the sample period, and are held until the end of the year, until new 
ESG information is published and the portfolios are rebalanced accordingly. Measures 
such as transaction costs and dividends are not considered when constructing the portfo-
lios.  
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To further clarify the portfolio creation process and provide an example, the following 
paragraph will describe the portfolio construction for the first test in greater detail. In a 
first step, using the year-end ESG scores of 2002, all companies compromising the S&P 
500 at that point in time were sorted from highest to lowest according to their individual 
Environmental-, Social-, and Governance scores respectively. In a second step, the 25% 
of companies exhibiting the highest E, S, and G scores respectively, were sorted into 
separate portfolios. Likewise, the 25% of companies exhibiting the lowest E, S, and G 
scores respectively were sorted into separate portfolios. Each of these portfolios were held 
until the end of the year, until they were rebalanced according to newly published ESG 
score information. This process was repeated until the end of the data period in 2016, 
resulting in six distinct portfolios (2E+2S+2G). Additionally, besides checking the impact 
of each individual dimension, a combined ESG measure was created. This ESG measure 
consists of the equally weighted average of the three respective individual scores, and 
similar to above, two portfolios were created consisting of the 25% highest (lowest) 
scores. 
 
With the completion of this process, eight (2E+2S+2G+2ESG) distinct portfolios were 
created to be used in the first analysis covering the whole sample period. Henceforward 
the portfolios containing the 25% best scored stocks of a dimension are called “Top”, 
e.g.: “E Top” indicates a portfolio compromised of the 25% of stocks with the highest 
Environmental score rating. Likewise “Bot” indicates the portfolios containing the 25% 
of stocks with the lowest ESG ratings. E.g.: “E Bot” indicates a portfolio consisting of 
the 25% of stocks with the lowest Environmental rating.  
 
To analyze the performance of SRI during the financial crisis period, another total of eight 
portfolios are created for the second analysis. These portfolios were created using the 
same process as described above, but limiting the data sample to the financial crisis period 
of 20 months starting in August 2007 and lasting to the end of March 2009. Additionally, 
another 16 portfolios were created for the two subsamples analyzed in the third and fourth 
test respectively. This amounts to a total of 32 Portfolios analyzed in this thesis: eight 
portfolios in the analysis covering the period of 2003 to 2017, eight portfolios covering 
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the whole financial crisis period from August 2007 to March 2009, as well as eight port-
folios for each of the financial crisis subsample periods.  
 
The following Table provides a descriptive statistic of the excess returns of the first eight 
portfolios. The excess returns were calculated by using the risk-free rate acquired from 
the database of French (2018). In detail, this summary statistic reports the mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the excess return time 
series covering the whole sample period. 
 
 
Table 2. This table represents the descriptive statistic of the excess returns of the previ-
ously constructed portfolios. The period covered consists of 168 monthly return observa-
tions lasting from January 2003 to January 2017. “E” indicates the portfolios constructed 
using Environmental scores as the deciding criteria. “S” and “G” denote portfolios con-
structed using Social- and Governance scores respectively. “ESG” denotes the portfolios 
constructed using the combined equally weighted average of the three individual scores 
“E”, “S”, and “G”. “Top” (“Bottom”) indicates that a portfolio was constructed using the 
25% of stocks with the highest (lowest) score of a given category. 
 Mean Median   Max   Min Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
E Top 0.768 1.045 17.040 -18.480 4.530 -0.353 5.345 
E Bot 0.671 0.735 20.760 -21.590 5.028 -0.393 6.319 
S Top 0.671 1.005 16.000 -19.390 4.280 -0.583 6.438 
S Bot 0.817 0.850 23.130 -23.490 5.178 -0.290 7.273 
G Top 0.755 1.105 16.010 -20.220 4.514 -0.652 6.286 
G Bot 0.831 0.915 21.610 -22.520 5.137 -0.343 6.546 
ESG Top  0.731 0.905 16.350 -19.360 4.393 -0.536 6.160 
ESG Bot 0.773 0.790 21.830 -22.530 5.083 -0.350 6.769 
 
 
Table 2 reports mixed results when investigated under the hypothesis that SRI still over-
performs. While the mean excess returns for all portfolios are very similar to each other 
at first glance, ranging from 0.67% to 0.83%, it is possible to see that the portfolio con-
sisting of the top 25% Environmental scored stocks outperforms its bottom counterpart 
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by almost 0.1%. However, except for the Environmental dimension, the mean excess re-
turns of the bottom portfolios of the S, G, and ESG dimensions are above their top coun-
terparts. These mixed observations might be a first indication that the hypothesis that SRI 
over-performs, does not hold. This claim is furthermore supported by similar mixed ob-
servations of the minimum and maximum values. The minimum values for the bottom 
portfolios are as expected lower compared to their top counterparts, ranging from -21.6% 
(E Bot) to -23.5% (S Bot), it is unexpected however to see that the bottom portfolios also 
have maximum values above those of their top counterparts, showing a difference in re-
spective maximum values of 3.8% (E Bot – E Top) to 7.1% (S Bot – S Top). Overall, 
Table 2 provides mixed results, which can indicate support for the rejection of the hy-
pothesis that SRI still over-performs. 
 
Continuing the portfolio analysis, the next table, Table 3, will present a first summary 
statistic for the portfolios created with the data of the financial crisis sample, as well as 
its subsamples. Panel A describes the summary statistics for the eight portfolios covering 
the whole time period. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for the shock to credit 
supply subsample representing the first 12 months of the financial crisis, while Panel C 
provides the summary statistics for decline in trust subsample representing the last eight 
months of the financial crisis. Overall, the descriptive statistic will provide observations 
for the excess return mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, 
and kurtosis values. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistic for the financial crisis monthly excess return series. “E”, 
“S”, “G” denote portfolios constructed using Environmental-, Social-, and Governance 
scores respectively. “Top” and “Bot” signify that the respective portfolio was constructed 
using the 25% of stocks with the highest (Top) or lowest (Bot) scores of a dimension. 
Panel A represents the excess return series, covering the 20 month financial crisis period 
in the US from August 2007 until, and including, March 2009. Panel B is a subsample 
that represents the shock to the credit supply that occurred in the early stages of the fi-
nancial crisis. This subsample consists of twelve monthly excess return observations, cov-
ering the period from August 2007 to July 2008. Panel C is a subsample of the financial 
crisis period that represents the unexpected decline in trust that occurred in the latter pe-
riod of the financial crisis. This subsample consists of eight monthly excess return obser-
vations, lasting from August 2008 to March 2009. 
Panel A: Whole Financial Crisis Period Sample 
 
 Mean Median   Max   Min Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
E Top -2.692 -1.245 11.23 -18.48 6.909 -0.324 2.931 
E Bot -3.744 -2.905 10.44 -21.63 7.693 -0.375 2.859 
S Top -2.966 -2.095 9.73 -19.39 6.826 -0.5 3.045 
S Bot -3.493 -1.74 9.38 -23.49 7.809 -0.69 3.316 
G Top -3.137 -1.135 9.72 -20.22 7.218 -0.585 2.917 
G Bot -3.770 -2.845 9.34 -22.52 7.684 -0.539 3.00 
ESG Top  -1.592 -0.205 7.25 -11.85 4.561 -0.411 2.841 
ESG Bot -3.67 -2.465 9.72 -22.55 7.688 -0.539 3.071 
Panel B: Shock to Credit Supply Subsample 
 
 Mean Median   Max   Min Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
E Top -1.105 -0.185 4.750 -10.360 4.146 -0.722 3.164 
E Bot -2.406 -2.300 4.210 -12.490 4.511 -0.778 3.330 
S Top -1.138 -0.585 4.950 -9.410 4.034 -0.478 2.593 
S Bot -1.647 -1.525 5.810 -10.570 4.345 -0.408 3.050 
G Top -1.282 -0.390 4.190 -9.480 4.019 -0.624 2.552 
G Bot -2.072 -2.050 5.680 -12.510 4.518 -0.595 3.848 
ESG Top  -0.361 0.275 3.160 -5.900 2.743 -0.725 2.608 
ESG Bot -2.042 -2.040 5.230 -11.860 4.387 -0.596 3.500 
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Panel C: Shock to Trust Subsample 
 
 Mean Median   Max   Min Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
E Top -5.074 -8.505 11.230 -18.480 9.578 0.402 2.163 
E Bot -5.790 -10.075 10.660 -21.590 11.061 0.239 1.811 
S Top -5.707 -8.230 9.730 -19.390 9.305 0.280 2.167 
S Bot -6.262 -9.680 9.380 -23.490 11.011 1.923 0.388 
G Top -5.920 -8.400 9.720 -20.220 10.063 0.206 1.870 
G Bot -6.317 -10.855 9.340 -22.520 10.762 0.144 1.858 
ESG Top  -5.566 -8.500 10.230 -19.360 9.628 0.298 2.064 
ESG Bot -6.122 -10.270 9.800 -22.530 10.922 0.143 1.864 
 
 
Panel A describes the excess portfolio returns over the whole financial crisis sample pe-
riod. As can be observed, the overall sample shows a negative mean excess return for all 
portfolios. However, the mean is less negative for portfolios sorted on the highest ESG 
scores. The difference ranges from 0.53% points between the portfolios sorted on the 
Social score dimension, up to a 2.08% difference between the combined ESG portfolios. 
This observation can be regarded as a support of the hypothesis that SRI over-performs 
during crises periods. Furthermore supporting this claim are the median values, which 
tend to be less negative for the top portfolios, indicating higher positive values. These 
observation are especially true for the ESG portfolio built using the combined top scores. 
Interestingly however, the median excess return value of the S Top portfolio shows that 
the portfolio contains more negative values than its bottom counterpart. Regarding the 
maximum and minimum values, it can be seen that the bottom portfolios exhibit larger 
negative values, ranging from -21.6% to -23.5%, while the top portfolios exhibit higher 
maximum values, ranging from 7.25% to 11.23%. Overall, Panel A supports the hypoth-
esis that SRI over-performs during crises periods. 
 
Panel B describes the excess returns of the first financial crisis subsample, covering the 
first 12 months, and representing a period marked by a sudden decline in credit supply. It 
can be observed that all means are negative, with the Top portfolios being less negative 
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than their respective bottom counterparts. Continuing with the analysis, the smallest dif-
ference in mean excess returns can be found between the portfolios built on the Social 
score, while the largest difference can be found between the combined ESG portfolios. 
The exact numbers are 0.5% and 1.68% respectively. When observing the median values, 
it becomes evident that the portfolios sorted on the highest scored stocks exhibit values 
that are far less negative than those of their counterparts. The exact difference in median 
values between the respective portfolio pairs ranges from 0.94% to 2.31%. The median 
value of the ESG Top portfolio even exhibits a positive median value, indicating higher 
positive excess return values, compared to negative ones. When observing the maximum 
and minimum values one can see that, as expected, the bottom portfolios exhibit lower 
minimum values. Surprisingly though, except for the Environmental portfolio pair, all 
bottom portfolios show higher maximum values, showing differences from 0.86% to 
2.07%. Overall, regarding the mean and median excess return values, Panel B continues 
to support the hypothesis that SRI over-performs during crises, and more specifically the 
hypothesis that SRI over-performs during credit supply crises. 
 
Continuing the descriptive statistics analysis, Panel C showcases the summary statistics 
for the second subsample period of the financial crisis. More specifically, Panel C shows 
the excess return mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and 
kurtosis values for the latter eight months of the financial crisis, a period marked by a 
sharp decline in market trust, as described by Lins et al. (2017) and evident via the Edel-
man (2009) Trust Barometer analysis. Similar to the previously analyzed panels A and B, 
the mean and median values of the top portfolios are less negative than their bottom coun-
terparts. In detail, the mean and median values of the bottom portfolios range from -5.7% 
to -6.3% and -9.7% to -10.3%, respectively. Meanwhile the mean and median values of 
the top portfolios rank from -5.1% to –5.9% and -8.2% to -8.5% respectively. Also similar 
to previous observations, the bottom portfolios show lower minimum values, while the 
top portfolios show higher maximum values. Overall, Panel C also indicates support for 
the hypothesis that SRI over-performs during crises, and more specifically during crises 
of trust. 
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Comparing the descriptive statistics of the credit supply shock subsample with the trust 
decline subsample, recorded in Panel B and Panel C respectively, it is possible to gather 
some interesting insights. The overall excess return means and medians are far lower dur-
ing the trust decline period, indicating a trust decline had a stronger impact on company 
returns, than a credit supply decline. In detail, the mean excess return differences between 
the portfolios of Panel B and Panel C range from 3.38% to 5.12%. 
 
Overall, concluding the analysis of the descriptive statistics depicted in Table 2 and Table 
3, it is possible to claim the following two things. First, over the whole sample period, 
there is little difference between portfolios sorted on the highest- and lowest scored 
stocks. This observation is in support of refuting the hypothesis that SRI still over-per-
forms. Second, during the financial crisis period, as well as its subsamples, portfolios 
sorted on the highest scored stocks provided less negative results than portfolios sorted 
on the lowest scored stocks, indicating support for the hypothesis that SRI still over-per-
forms, albeit only during crises periods. 
 
 
4.2. Performance measurement 
 
The following subchapter revolves around explaining the model used in the empirical 
OLS regression analysis, as well as explaining how it differs from other frequently used 
models in academic literature that analyze SRI performance. In detail, this part describes 
the new five-factor asset pricing model introduced by Fama & French (2015), and how it 
differs compared to the three-factor model introduced in 1993 by the same authors, as 
well as the enhanced four-factor model introduced by Carhart (1997). 
 
Commonly used asset-pricing models in SRI performance related academic literature are 
the well-known three-factor asset pricing model introduced by Fama & French (1993), 
and the enhanced four-factor model introduced by Carhart (1997). Examples of renowned 
papers that make use of at least one of these models to determine SRI performance are 
among others: Renneboog et al. (2008a), Hong & Kacperczyk (2009), Derwall et al. 
(2011), Bebchuk et al. (2013), Borgers et al. (2013), and Brzeszczyński & McIntosh 
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(2014). While both of the previously mentioned asset pricing models are prevailing in 
literature, this thesis will make use of the recently introduced five-factor asset pricing 
model. By using the five-factor asset pricing model, this thesis is to the author’s 
knowledge the first and only SRI performance analysis that makes use of this new model. 
Furthermore, besides enriching existing academic literature by using a new model to reex-
amine the relationship between SRI and portfolio returns, the five factor model is also 
shown to be more accurate than its predecessors, the three-, and four factor model, thus 
providing the possibility of further validating previously documented results. More spe-
cifically, the five-factor model should be able to explain up to 94% of the cross-section 
variance of the expected portfolio returns (Fama & French 2015). 
 
In the following paragraph, the three-factor model will be explained in detail, before pro-
ceeding to explain the four-, and five-factor models respectively. This way it is ensured 
that a reader can comprehend the regression results, as well as understand the possible 
differences between this and other analyses. 
 
The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is designed to complement the CAPM, 
specified by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Specifically, the three factor-model was 
created to capture factors left unexplained by the CAPM: the relationship between aver-
age return and market capitalization, and the relationship between average return and 
price ratios such as the Book-to-Market ratio. (Fama & French 2015) 
 
 
(1) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡.  
 
 
The above model represents the three-factor model, as specified by Fama & French 
(1993). In this equation, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents the return on a security or portfolio i for the period 
t, while 𝑅𝐹𝑡 represents the risk-free return. 𝛼𝑖 represents the unexplainable portion of the 
return, also called abnormal return. 𝑅𝑀𝑡  is the return on a value-weighted market portfo-
lio. In detail,  𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the excess return on a market portfolio consisting of all firms 
in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ universe, minus the one-month Treasury bill 
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rate. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, “Small Minus Big”, also called the size factor, represents the return on a di-
versified portfolio made up of small stocks minus the return on a diversified portfolio 
made up of big stocks. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, the abbreviation of “High Minus Low”, represents the value 
factor and measures the difference between portfolios made up of high- and low book-to-
market stocks. Finally, 𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents a zero-mean residual, and is known as the error term. 
 
While the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model managed to improve on the pricing 
errors of the CAPM, the model is nevertheless unable to fully describe the cross-sectional 
variations in portfolio returns. In particular, the three-factor model is unable to capture 
the momentum anomaly, as described by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). This is evident 
in the results reported by Carhart (1997), who shows strong negative loadings on last 
year’s loser stock portfolios and strong positive loadings on last year’s winner portfolios. 
To improve on the average pricing errors of the three-factor model, Carhart (1997) con-
structs his four-factor model by combining the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model with Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) momentum factor, eliminating a great portion 
of still existing pricing errors.  
 
 
(2) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 +
𝑒𝑖𝑡.  
 
 
The above equation represents the four-factor model as specified by Carhart (1997). As 
described, Carhart (1997) created his model by combining the three-factor model of Fama 
and French (1993), with the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993). The 
momentum factor 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 , “Up Minus Down”, represents the return difference between a 
portfolio compromised of the past 12-month winner stocks, and a portfolio compromised 
of the past 12-month loser stocks. The rest of the equation remains unchanged compared 
to (1). 
 
Continuing in this line of asset pricing model improvements is the recent paper by Fama 
and French (2015). Following evidence pointing out further incompleteness of the three-
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factor model, as shown for example by Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), and Novy-Marx 
(2013) among others, Fama and French (2015) introduced the five-factor model in re-
sponse. The goal of the additions to the three-factor model are in particular to capture the 
factors of “profitability” and “investment”. Novy-Marx (2013) finds in his paper that 
profitability, as measured by gross profits-to-assets, has the same predictive power of the 
cross-section of average returns as the book-to-market value. Furthermore, as shown in 
his paper, including the profitability factor into the three-, or four-factor model, signifi-
cantly decreases the pricing errors. Similarly, Titman et al. (2004) find in their paper that 
an abnormal level of capital investment is negatively related to future stock return, and 
both the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model fail to fully reflect this. 
 
 
(3) 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 +
𝛽5,𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡.  
  
 
The above equation shows the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. The five-factor 
model enhances the three-factor model (1) by adding two new factors. The  𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 , “Ro-
bust Minus Weak” factor is the difference between the returns of a diversified portfolio 
consisting of stocks with high profitability, and the returns of a diversified portfolio con-
sisting of stocks with low profitability. 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 , or “Conservative Minus Aggressive”, is 
the difference between the returns of diversified portfolio consisting of low investment 
firms, minus the returns of a diversified portfolio consisting of high investment firms. In 
their paper, Fama and French (2015) show that by including these two new factors, and 
despite not including the momentum factor employed in the four-factor model, the five-
factor model is able to explain up to 94% of the cross-section variance in returns of the 
examined portfolios. 
 
In this thesis, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 represents the excess returns of the various ESG portfolios pre-
viously created. It was calculated by using the risk-free rate gathered from Kenneth R, 
French’s (2018) homepage, which also served as source for the data on the 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, 
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𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡, and 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 factors. The model (3) presented above will be used in the OLS regres-
sion analysis, to determine if portfolios sorted on ESG factors provide any statistical sig-
nificant returns (𝛼𝑖) that cannot be explained by the five factors. If the results indicate 
that ESG factors can be used to achieve statistical significant abnormal returns, this would 
stand in support of the hypothesis that SRI over-performs.  
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5. RESULTS 
 
The following chapter describes the results of the regression analyses. Chapter 5.1 show-
cases and describes the results for the analysis covering the whole sample period of 14 
years, chapter 5.2 describes the results for the whole financial crisis period of 20 months, 
and chapter 5.3 showcases and describe the results for the financial crisis subs-samples: 
the credit supply decline, and the trust decline periods respectively. The results were gen-
erated by conducting OLS regression analyses utilizing the new Fama & French (2015) 
five factor model, and the portfolios constructed earlier. Alpha, describes the part of the 
returns that is left unexplained by the other five factors, and represents possible infor-
mation contained in ESG scores. Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA represent the 
five-factors respectively, as described in chapter 4.2 in detail. R2 is the ratio of the ex-
plained variation to the total variation, and indicates how well the model explains the 
results. A higher R2 represents a better model. 
 
 
5.1. Whole sample period 
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Table 4. This table reports the OLS regression results for the whole sample period, using 
the five-factor model as specified by Fama & French (2015). The period consists of 168 
monthly return observations lasting from January 2003 to January 2017. “E”, “S”, “G” 
denote portfolios constructed using Environmental-, Social-, and Governance scores re-
spectively. “Top” and “Bot” signify that the respective portfolio was constructed using 
the 25% of stocks with the highest (Top) or lowest (Bot) scores. “Top-Bot” showcases 
the results of the difference between the top and the bottom portfolio. Alpha indicates the 
estimated coefficient. The results for Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, RMW, and CMA indicate the 
factor loadings. R2 represents the goodness-of-fit. The p-values can be found in paren-
theses below the results. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively. 
 Alpha Rm-Rf   SMB   HML RMW CMA R2 
E Top -0.038 1.061*** -0.086* 0.127** 0.020 0.046 0.91 
 (0.73) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.78) (0.60)  
E Bot -0.188* 1.086*** 0.158*** 0.209*** -0.088 -0.157* 0.93 
 (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.07)  
E Top-Bot 0.150 -0.025 -0.246*** -0.081 0.108 0.203* 0.18 
 (0.28) (0.53) (0.00) (0.20) (0.23) (0.07)  
        
S Top -0.128* 1.038*** -0.036 0.064* 0.067 0.019 0.96 
 (0.08) (0.00) (0.30) (0.06) (0.16) (0.74)  
S Bot -0.067 1.121*** 0.198*** 0.052 -0.140* -0.010 0.92 
 (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.07) (0.92)  
S Top-Bot -0.061 -0.083*** -0.234*** 0.012 0.207*** 0.028 0.39 
 (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.73)  
        
G Top -0.073 1.053*** 0.073** 0.055 -0.001 0.025 0.96 
 (0.35) (0.00) (0.046) (0.11) (0.98) (0.68)  
G Bot -0.053 1.128*** 0.138*** 0.154*** -0.127* -0.056 0.94 
 (0.60) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.48)  
G  Top-Bot -0.020 -0.075*** -0.065 -0.099** 0.126** 0.081 0.24 
 (0.83) (0.00) (0.14) (0.02) (0.04) (0.27)  
        
ESG Top  -0.079 1.05*** -0.017 0.082** 0.028 0.030 0.96 
 (0.27) (0.00) (0.62) (0.013) (0.54) (0.60)  
ESG Bot -0.103 1.112*** 0.165*** 0.138*** -0.119* -0.074 0.94 
 (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.35)  
ESG  
Top-Bot 
0.024 -0.061** -0.182*** -0.056 0.147** 0.104 0.35 
 (0.79) (0.02) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.14)  
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Investigating the results of the regression in regards to the hypothesis H1: “High ESG 
scores are positively related to stock performance at all times”, there are several observa-
tions that seem to refute this hypothesis. First, all portfolios sorted on the highest scored 
stocks indicate that the respective dimension is negatively related to performance, which 
in case of the Social dimension is even statistically significant at the 10% level. This is 
surprising, as it indicates that high Social scores are actually negatively related to stock 
performance. Second, while the bottom scored portfolios are as expected negatively re-
lated to performance, with the results of the Environmental dimension even indicating 
that low E scores are negatively related to performance statistically significant at the 10% 
level, the difference between the top and bottom portfolios does not exhibit any statistical 
significance. Summarizing, these findings reject the first hypothesis, as neither a best-in-
class approach, nor a long-short strategy, seems to be related to positive abnormal returns. 
Rather, most of these findings support the prevailing theory in academic literature that 
SRI neither over-, nor underperforms. 
 
Continuing, analyzing the five-factors it is possible to see that over the whole sample 
period, the market factor Rm-Rf is mostly positively related to stock returns, as well as 
highly significant. This indicates that the expected returns are mostly driven by the mar-
ket. Additionally, the SMB factor tends to be highly significant and positively related to 
the bottom portfolios, while being negatively related and less significant for the top port-
folios, and strongly negative and significant for the Top – Bot portfolios. This result in-
dicates that small companies tend to outperform big companies, while additionally having 
lower ESG scores compared to big companies. The HML factor is slightly positive and 
highly statistical significant in most cases, expect for the S Bot and G Top portfolios. This 
results indicates that returns are furthermore partly driven by the “High Minus Low” fac-
tor, indicating that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks. The RMW factor ex-
hibits mostly weak statistical significance, with mixed results, and the CMA factor only 
exhibits weak statistical significance in two cases. 
 
Concluding the analysis, the Hypothesis: “H1: High ESG scores are positively related to 
stock performance at all times”, has to be rejected. The results indicate that ESG scores 
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are not positively related to stock returns. In fact, using a cut-off rate of 75%, the portfo-
lios indicate that ESG scores are slightly negative related with stock returns. However the 
results are statistically not significant. Furthermore, regarding the research question: “Is 
it still possible to achieve superior returns with a SRI investment strategy in the US?”, the 
answer is no. Neither does a best-in-class portfolio consisting of the top rated 25% ESG 
stocks generate any abnormal returns, nor does a long-short investment strategy of buying 
(selling) the top (bottom) portfolios. Concluding this first analysis, it is impossible to 
generate abnormal returns with SRI in the US. 
 
However, while these results fail to give any new insight, they provide support for the 
learning effect reported by Borgers et al. (2013) and Bebchuk et al. (2013). Since the 
findings reported in this thesis indicate that returns are mostly driven by the market factor, 
it is possible to conclude that whatever information ESG score might have held in the 
past, the market since learned to incorporate it into their return expectations, further indi-
cating that it is impossible for SRI to generate abnormal returns in the US. 
 
 
5.2. Financial crisis period 
 
The results of chapter 5.1 indicate it is impossible to achieve superior returns with SRI in 
the US under normal circumstances. However, Lins et al. (2017) report that it still possi-
ble, albeit during crises periods, and more specifically during low trust (crisis) periods. 
The following table report the results of the OLS regression for the whole financial crisis 
periods, lasting 20 months from August 2007, to March 2009. 
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Table 5. This table reports the OLS regression results for the whole financial crisis sam-
ple period in the US, using the five-factor model as specified by Fama & French (2015). 
The period consists of 20 monthly return observations lasting from August 2007 to March 
2009. “E”, “S”, “G” denote portfolios constructed using Environmental-, Social-, and 
Governance scores respectively. “Top” and “Bot” signify that the respective portfolio was 
constructed using the 25% of stocks with the highest (Top) or lowest (Bot) scores. “Top-
Bot” showcases the results of the difference between the top and the bottom portfolio. 
Alpha indicates the estimated coefficient. The results for Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, RMW, and 
CMA indicate the factor loadings. The p-values can be found in parentheses below the 
results. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level re-
spectively. 
 Alpha Rm-Rf   SMB   HML RMW CMA R2 
E Top 0.580** 1.00*** -0.08 0.100 -0.429** 0.052 0.99 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.47) (0.12) (0.02) (0.77)  
E Bot -0.632 0.982*** 0.475 0.144 -0.301 -0.116 0.93 
 (0.40) (0.00) (0.13) (0.41) (0.51) (0.82)  
E Top-Bot 1.212* 0.022 -0.555** -0.044 -0.128 0.168 0.38 
 (0.05) (0.86) (0.03) (0.75) (0.72) (0.68)  
        
S Top 0.147 1.049*** -0.007 0.019 -0.239 0.126 0.99 
 (0.61) (0.00) (0.95) (0.77) (0.19) (0.53)  
S Bot -0.666 1.144*** 0.479* -0.032 0.147 -0.204 0.96 
 (0.28) (0.00) (0.07) (0.82) (0.69) (0.63)  
S Top-Bot 0.813 -0.094 -0.486** 0.051 -0.386 0.329 0.43 
 (0.15) (0.40) (0.04) (0.69) (0.25) (0.38)  
        
G Top -0.043 1.026*** 0.252 -0.034 -0.340 -0.035 0.98 
 (0.92) (0.00) (0.15) (0.72) (0.18) (0.90)  
G Bot -0.779 1.144*** 0.196 0.122 0.134 -0.181 0.96 
 (0.18) (0.00) (0.40) (0.36) (0.69) (0.64)  
G  Top-Bot 0.736 -0.118 0.056 -0.157 -0.474 0.147 0.25 
 (0.20) (0.31) (0.81) (0.24) (0.18) (0.70)  
        
ESG Top  0.585** 0.684*** -0.128 0.007* -0.300 0.062 0.98 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.24) (0.90) (0.07) (0.72)  
ESG Bot -0.962 1.090*** 0.383 0.078 -0.007 -0.166 0.96 
 (0.26) (0.00) (0.13) (0.57) (0.98) (0.68)  
ESG  
Top-Bot 
1.276* -0.406** -0.510* -0.071 -0.293 0.228 0.75 
 (0.08) (0.012) (0.09) (0.66) (0.49) (0.63)  
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As the results indicate, a portfolio sorted on the 25% highest Environmental scores was 
able to achieve an abnormal return of 0.58% per month, statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Furthermore, comparing the results of the E Top and -Bottom portfolios, it is pos-
sible to generate an abnormal return of 1.21% per month, statistically significant at the 
10% level. Continuing, while portfolios sorted on Social and Governance scores are not 
statistically significant, portfolios sorted on the combined ESG score are. A portfolio con-
sisting of the top ESG stocks was able to generate an abnormal return of around 0.59% 
per month, statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, applying a long-short ap-
proach over the ESG portfolios, it was possible to generate around 1.3% of abnormal 
return per month during the financial crisis. While the market factor is highly significant 
is most cases, the model was overall unable to price the information contained in ESG 
scores correctly. 
 
The results indicate that the hypothesis: “H2: High ESG scores are positively related to 
stock performance during financial crisis periods”, does not get rejected. In regards to the 
research question: “Is it still possible to achieve superior returns with a SRI investment 
strategy in the US?”, the answer is yes.  It is indeed possible to generate abnormal returns 
with SRI in the US, albeit only during financial crisis periods, and more specifically, by 
using a best-in-class, or long-short approach based on Environmental scores or a com-
bined ESG score. 
 
 
5.3. Financial crisis sub-periods 
 
Taking inspiration from Lins et al. (2017) the following two tests are aimed at differenti-
ating the previously achieved results, which indicate that it is possible to generate abnor-
mal returns with SRI during financial crises periods.  Lins at al. (2017) reports that SRI, 
with high ESG scores as a proxy for trust, specifically over-performs during low trust 
periods. Hence this thesis will follow Lins et al. (2017) and conduct tests for the men-
tioned subsamples of the financial crisis period, to possibly give more precise insight to 
the results reported in Table 5, as well as to apprise Lins et al.’s (2017) results with a 
different set of data and methods. 
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Table 6 and 7 will investigate the performance of SRI during two financial crisis period 
subsamples. Table 6 in detail will investigate the 12-month period from August 2007 to 
July 2008. This subsample reflects a decline in credit supply, as the increasing LIBOR 
had a negative impact on the solvency of the market participants (Lins et al. 2017). The 
second subsample period covers the next 8-month period, from August 2008 to March 
2009. This second subsample reflects the sudden decline in market wide trust, caused due 
to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Lins et al. 2017). It is important to note that while 
credit supply limitations were also present in the later period of the financial crisis, the 
trust decline had not yet occurred during the first subsample. This way, this thesis aims 
at isolating the performance of high trust stocks, proxied by high ESG scores, during a 
low trust period, to determine the performance of SRI. 
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Table 6. This table reports the OLS regression results for the “credit supply decline” 
financial crisis subsample period, using the five-factor model as specified by Fama & 
French (2015). The period consists of 12 monthly return observations lasting from August 
2007 to July 2008. “E”, “S”, “G” denote portfolios constructed using Environmental-, 
Social-, and Governance scores respectively. “Top” and “Bot” signify that the respective 
portfolio was constructed using the 25% of stocks with the highest (Top) or lowest (Bot) 
scores. “Top-Bot” showcases the results of the difference between the top and the bottom 
portfolio. Alpha indicates the estimated coefficient. The results for Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
RMW, and CMA indicate the factor loadings. The p-values can be found in parentheses 
below the results. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
 Alpha Rm-Rf   SMB   HML RMW CMA R2 
E Top 0.388** 1.082*** -0.346*** 0.372*** -0.075 0.117 0.99 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.17)  
E Bot -0.909 1.291*** -0.295 0.759** 0.459 0.357 0.93 
 (0.18) (0.00) (0.38) (0.02) (0.39) (0.56)  
E Top-Bot 1.297* -0.209 -0.051 -0.387 -0.534 -0.176 0.42 
 (0.08) (0.42) (0.88) (0.19) (0.35) (0.78)  
        
S Top 0.132 1.038*** -0.096 0.284* -0.006 0.034 0.98 
 (0.68) (0.00) (0.54) (0.05) (0.98) (0.90)  
S Bot -0.545 1.399*** -0.199 0.350 0.924 0.482 0.93 
 (0.38) (0.00) (0.54) (0.20) (0.11) (0.43)  
S Top-Bot 0.667 -0.360 0.103 -0.066 -0.930 -0.450 0.35 
 (0.33) (0.19) (0.77) (0.81) (0.13) (0.50)  
        
G Top -0.044 1.067*** -0.011 0.076 0.040 0.204 0.99 
 (0.85) (0.00) (0.93) (0.44) (0.84) (0.39)  
G Bot -0.732 1.344*** -0.496 0.552** 0.594 0.279 0.95 
 (0.20) (0.00) (0.11) (0.04) (0.22) (0.60)  
G  Top-Bot 0.688 -0.277 0.485* -0.476** -0.554 -0.075 0.64 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.08) (0.04) (0.18) (0.87)  
        
ESG Top  0.549* 0.646*** -0.136 0.020 -0.190 0.070 0.97 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.34) (0.85) (0.40) (0.78)  
ESG Bot -0.728 1.344*** -0.330 0.554** 0.657 0.373 0.95 
 (0.19) (0.00) (0.24) (0.03) (0.16) (0.46)  
ESG  
Top-Bot 
1.277 -0.698** 0.194 -0.534 -0.847 -0.303 0.67 
 (0.11) (0.04) (0.61) (0.11) (0.19) (0.67)  
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Table 6 reports results similar to Table 5. During the credit supply decline period, it was 
possible to achieve abnormal returns by applying SRI strategies. In detail, using a best-
in-class approach and cut-off rates of 75%, a portfolio sorted on the highest Environmen-
tal score yielded statistically significant monthly returns of around 0.4%, while a portfolio 
sorted on the combined ESG score yielded statistically significant abnormal returns of 
0.55% per month. Additionally, applying a long-short strategy in combination with port-
folios consisting of the highest (lowest) 25% E scores, it was possible to generate abnor-
mal returns of 1.3% per month, statistically significant at the 10% level. Similar to the 
results of the whole financial crisis sample reported in Table 5, portfolios sorted on Social 
and Governance score do not yield any statistical significant return, although the results 
indicate that the respective top portfolios are positively (less negatively) related to stock 
returns, while the bottom portfolios are more strongly negative related with stock returns. 
Analyzing these results under the premise of the hypothesis H3: “High ESG scores are 
positively related to stock performance during credit supply shock crisis periods”, the 
hypothesis holds and does not get rejected. It was possible to achieve superior returns 
with SRI during the credit decline period of the financial crisis. Interestingly, these results 
are opposed by Lins et al. (2017) who report no such findings. On the contrary, the authors 
report that SRI does neither over- nor underperform during the credit supply shock sub-
sample. 
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Table 7. This table reports the OLS regression results for the “decline in trust” financial 
crisis subsample period, using the five-factor model as specified by Fama & French 
(2015). The period consists of 8 monthly return observations lasting from August 2008 
to March 2009. “E”, “S”, “G” denote portfolios constructed using Environmental-, So-
cial-, and Governance scores respectively. “Top” and “Bot” signify that the respective 
portfolio was constructed using the 25% of stocks with the highest (Top) or lowest (Bot) 
scores. “Top-Bot” showcases the results of the difference between the top and the bottom 
portfolio. Alpha indicates the estimated coefficient. The results for Rm-Rf, SMB, HML, 
RMW, and CMA indicate the factor loadings. The p-values can be found in parentheses 
below the results. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
 Alpha Rm-Rf   SMB   HML RMW CMA R2 
E Top 1.372** 1.023*** 0.109 -0.058 -0.915** 0.599* 0.99 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.14) (0.13) (0.02) (0.06)  
E Bot 0.089 1.024** 1.008 -0.091 -0.382 0.134 0.98 
 (0.97) (0.04) (0.22) (0.79) (0.84) (0.95)  
E Top-Bot 1.275 -0.000 -0.900 0.034 -0.527 0.462 0.72 
 (0.60) (0.99) (0.29) (0.92) (0.80) (0.84)  
        
S Top 0.528 1.075*** 0.076 -0.142 -0.742 0.718 0.99 
 (0.41) (0.00) (0.68) (0.22) (0.24) (0.30)  
S Bot 0.197 1.081** 1.097 -0.360 -0.966 1.004 0.99 
 (0.90) (0.01) (0.11) (0.22) (0.50) (0.53)  
S Top-Bot 0.332 -0.006 -1.023 0.218 0.222 -0.285 0.87 
 (0.83) (0.97) (0.13) (0.41) (0.87) (0.85)  
        
G Top 1.973 0.912** 0.783 -0.398 -2.646* 2.509 0.99 
 (0.19) (0.01) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13)  
G Bot -0.938 1.155*** 0.779** -0.086 0.340 -0.221 0.99 
 (0.21) (0.00) (0.03) (0.39) (0.53) (0.71)  
G  Top-Bot 2.915 -0.243 0.005 -0.312 -2.986 2.733 0.84 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.99) (0.27) (0.13) (0.18)  
        
ESG Top  1.290 1.003*** 0.321 -0.199 -1.430* 1.271 0.99 
 (0.14 (0.00) (0.20) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15)  
ESG Bot -0.215 1.086** 0.961 -0.179 -0.337 0.304 0.99 
 (0.867) (0.013) (0.108) (0.414) (0.768) (0.813)  
ESG  
Top-Bot 
1.513 -0.084 -0.638 -0.021 -1.104 0.977 0.80 
 (0.416) (0.655) (0.292) (0.935) (0.488) (0.577)  
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Table 7 reports statistically significant alphas only for the E Top portfolio. More specifi-
cally, the result shows that during the low trust period of the financial crisis, it was pos-
sible to generate abnormal returns of almost 1.4% a month, by investing in a portfolio 
consisting of the 25% of stocks with the highest Environmental score in the S&P 500 
universe. While the top portfolios sorted on the other scores are highly positive related to 
stock performance, the results are not statistically significant. Additionally, despite being 
positively related to stock performance, none of the long-short portfolios indicate any 
statistical significance. Analyzing these results in regard to the hypothesis, H4: “High 
ESG scores are positively related to stock performance during low trust crisis periods”, 
the hypothesis holds true and does not get rejected, indicating it is possible for SRI to 
over-perform during trust crises. Surprisingly however, the results differ compared to the 
ones reported by Lins et al. (2017). Lins et al. (2017) report that a combined ESG score 
portfolio achieved statistical significant abnormal returns during the low trust period. This 
thesis’ results however indicate that only the Environmental dimension yielded any sta-
tistical significant returns. While a high combined ESG score is positive related to stock 
performance, it is not statistically significant. 
 
Comparing the results listed in Tables 6 and 7, it is possible to report that during both 
crises periods it was possible to generate abnormal returns by applying SRI strategies. 
However, during the low trust crisis period, high ESG scores were more strongly related 
to abnormal performance, than during the credit shock crisis period. To be specific, a 
portfolio sorted on the highest Environmental scores, could achieve an abnormal statisti-
cal significant return of around 0.4% a month during the credit supply crisis, and almost 
1.4% a month during the low trust period. A difference of 1% a month. Additionally, 
while not significant, high scores across the other dimensions are similarly related to 
higher stock returns during the trust decline subsample. While this thesis fails to repro-
duce the exact results reported by Lins et al. (2017), this thesis can confirm the finding 
that high ESG scores can work as a proxy for trust, as indicated by the performance of 
high ESG score portfolios during low trust periods. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter concludes this Master thesis by restating the purpose of the study and the 
research question it aimed at answering, mentioning the data and methods used in the 
analysis, and describing the regression results and how they relate to the contribution of 
this thesis as well as to existing academic literature. Furthermore limitations to this study 
will be listed, as well as possibilities for further studies in this field of research. 
 
This paper investigated the research question: “Is it still possible to achieve superior re-
turns with a SRI investment strategy in the US?”. Previous academic research on the fi-
nancial performance of SRI, such as paper by Kempf & Osthoff (2007), and Statman & 
Glushkov (2009) among many others, report that incorporating SRI into investment de-
cisions generates highly significant abnormal returns. However, according to Borgers et 
al. (2013) and Bebchuk et al. (2013), this lasted only until the year 2001. The authors 
report that SRI related information was mispriced, leading to the experienced abnormal 
returns. As soon as the market learned to price this information correctly, SRI tended to 
not perform any different compared to conventional investments. Recent papers by Auer 
(2016) and Lins et al. (2017) however, provide new insights. Auer (2016) reported that 
by using a new set of data, he found that it is still possible to generate abnormal returns 
with SRI strategies in Europe, which is among the oldest and biggest markets for SRI. 
Similarly, Lins et al. (2017) report that SRI can also be used to generate significant ab-
normal returns in the US, albeit only during periods marked by a sharp decline in trust. 
 
Taking inspiration from earlier academic literature on SRI, Auer (2016), and Lins et al. 
(2017), this paper reinvestigates the financial performance of SRI with a new set of data 
and methods, which have been rarely used in academic literature before. In detail, this 
thesis uses data from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG and the Fama & French (2015) 
five-factor asset pricing model to estimate the performance of SRI in the S&P 500 uni-
verse. To answer the research question, four hypotheses were set up and tested in this 
thesis. The first test covers the whole sample period of 168 months, investigating the 
performance of a best-in-class approach, as well as a long-short strategy based on earlier 
SRI considerations. The second, third, and fourth test, all revolve around the performance 
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of SRI during the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. Partly emulating Lins et al. (2017), this 
study does not only investigate the performance of SRI during the financial crisis as a 
whole, but also during two subsample periods: a credit supply decline subsample, and a 
trust decline subsample. 
 
This thesis finds that SRI does not generate any abnormal returns over the whole sample 
period. This results is in line with Borgers et al. (2013) and Bebchuk et al. (2013) who 
report that SRI does not provide any significant returns after 2001 under normal circum-
stances, as well as Lins et al. (2017), who report no statistical significant findings outside 
the financial crisis period. Furthermore in regard to the overall academic debate on the 
performance of SRI, this results supports the hypothesis that SRI does neither over-, nor 
underperform. However, the test does show that a portfolio of the lowest 25% Environ-
mental scored stocks generates statistically significant negative returns of almost 0.2%, 
indicating that while positive ESG scores are not related to abnormal performance any-
more, a lack of thereof is related to negative abnormal performance. 
 
Continuing, this thesis finds that SRI could have been used to generate statistically sig-
nificant abnormal returns during the financial crisis period, and more specifically, during 
both, a period of credit decline, and a period of trust decline. Over all three tests, the 
regression results report a statistically significant return of around 0.4% to 0.6% per 
month by following a best-in-class approach using Environmental- or combined ESG 
scores, as well as 1.2% to 1.3% statistical significant abnormal return per month by fol-
lowing a long-short approach based on buying (selling) the top (bottom) Environmental- 
or combined ESG score portfolio. These findings are furthermore partly consistent with 
Lins et al. (2017), who on one hand report significant abnormal returns during the trust 
decline period, but on the other hand no significant results during the credit supply decline 
subsample. 
 
Summarizing these results in regards to answering the research question: “Is it still pos-
sible to achieve superior returns with a SRI investment strategy in the US?”, the author 
has to say: “It depends”. Under normal circumstances it is impossible to generate abnor-
mal returns with SRI. However, during crises periods, such as during the financial crisis, 
75 
 
it was possible to generate abnormal returns with SRI. Additional insights that can be 
made in light of these results are twofold. First, it is possible to infer that engaging in 
CSR activities can be seen as an insurance for companies that pays off during economic 
crises (Lins et al. 2017). Second, it is possible to infer from the results that a high engage-
ment in CSR activities, especially in the Environmental dimension, is beneficial to firm 
performance, as a lack thereof relates to negative performance. 
 
While the results of this thesis are mostly supported by literature, there are several limi-
tations that this thesis and the results are subjected to. First, the observed period for the 
decline in trust subsample reported in table 7, is relatively small, consisting of only eight 
monthly observations. This might be the case why the results reported in this thesis differ 
from those reported by Lins et al. (2017). To mend this limitation, a weekly observation 
approach might be preferable. Second, another limitation linked to the difference in re-
sults between this thesis and Lins et al. (2017) might be that in the latter, the authors 
sorted the companies in their sample by industry and excluded the financial ones. This 
was not done in this thesis, to not limit the possible investment universe. 
 
Nevertheless, these limitations open up the possibility for further research. It would be 
possible to reexamine this thesis by more closely following Lins et al. (2017), and sorting 
the companies in the sample by industry. Furthermore, in light of the results reported by 
Auer (2016), it would be interesting to reexamine this thesis with a set of European data 
to apprise his results, or investigate the performance of SRI during the financial crisis, or 
the Eurozone crisis in Europe. Moreover, it would be also possible to replicate this study 
with a different investment universe, or higher cut-off rates. 
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